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PROCESS CONSTRAINTS IN TORT*
James A. Henderson, Jr. t
Fierce debates have raged in recent years over the objectives re-
flected in the tort-law system. A growing number of observers insist that
tort law reflects efforts to achieve allocative efficiency and wealth max-
imization.' A somewhat smaller, but no less intensely committed,
number insist that tort law primarily reflects fairness concerns.2 To
these may be added writers who maintain that liability rules are sup-
ported by a combination of efficiency and fairness considerations. 3 Un-
derstandably enough, these social policy debates tend to focus on the
substantive content of tort law. What, various writers have asked, does
the traditional refusal of courts to recognize a general duty to rescue tell
us about the objectives of tort? Does such refusal suggest that fairness,
rather than efficiency, is the underlying theme? Or does it constitute
proof positive of precisely the opposite hypothesis?
Rather than engage in these debates, I would like to explore the
possibility that some, at least, of the substantive tort doctrines that fair-
ness and efficiency theorists seek to reconcile with their world views are
more readily explainable in terms of the constraints imposed by the
processes by which liability rules are implemented both in and out of
court. Could it be, for example, that the refusal to impose a general
duty to rescue has less to do with substantive objectives than with con-
straints of process? In this analysis, I will argue for exactly that conclu-
sion. Whatever one's view of the underlying objectives of tort, to
accomplish those objectives tort law must effectively guide behavior. I
shall demonstrate that this necessity imposes constraints that very much
* ©1982 James A. Henderson, Jr.
f Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law. A.B. 1959, Princeton University;
LL.B. 1962, LL.M. 1964, Harvard. The author wishes to thank John Englander, a third-year
law student at the Boston University School of Law, for his research assistance.
I See, e.g., Posner, The Ethical and Political Basis of the EBftcieny Nom in Common Law Adju-
dication, 8 HoFsTRA L. REv. 487 (1980); Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theony, 8 J.
LEGAL STUD. 103 (1979); Posner, A Theoy of Negligence, I J. LEGAL STUD. 29 (1972); Shavell,
Strict Liability versus Negligence, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1980). For recent criticism of these views,
see Coleman, Etiengy, Utility, and Wealth Maimization, 8 HOFSTRA L. REv. 509 (1980).
2 See, e.g., Epstein, Defenses and Subsequent Pleas in a System of Strict Liability, 3 J. LEGAL
STUD. 165 (1974); Epstein, A Theon7 of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151 (1973); Fletcher,
Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REv. 537 (1972).
3 See, e.g., G. CALABRESI, THE CosTs OF ACCIDENTS (1970); Calabresi, About Law and
Economics: A Letter to Ronald Dworkin, 8 HOFSTRA L. REv. 553 (1980). Dworkin criticizes
Calabresi's use of "fairness overrides." See Dworkin, Why Eftiienq?, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 563
(1980).
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affect, and thus help to explain, the substantive content of tort doctrine.
From time to time, courts and commentators have recognized the exist-
ence of these constraints. But never have they been drawn together sys-
tematically and advanced as analytical tools with which to explain
substantive tort doctrine. Part I of this article develops a process per-
spective on tort and describes the conditions necessary for tort law to
guide primary and adjudicative behavior. It then derives process con-
straints from these conditions and considers their relevance to the sub-
stantive objectives of tort law. Parts II and III bring these constraints to
bear on traditional tort doctrine, including some areas for which neither
fairness4 nor efficiency 5 theorists have been able adequately to account,
demonstrating both the descriptive and the prescriptive force of the pro-
cess perspective.
I
DEVELOPING A PROCESS PERSPECTIVE ON TORT LAW
The phrase "process perspective on tort law" is likely to be under-
stood to invite analysis of the various processes and procedures by which
liability rules are applied both in and out of court. Such an implication
would be consistent with Professor Summers's provocative Process Values
article that appeared several years ago in this law review. 6 My focus,
however, is narrower. The "process perspective" to which I refer focuses
not on the processes themselves, but rather on the effects that these
processes have on the substantive content of the tort law. My inquiry is
not directed toward improving process; instead, it aims at increasing our
understanding of the concessions that substantive tort law must make to
the realities of process.
4 See, e.g., Vaughan v. Menlove, 3 Bing. (N.C.) 468, 475, 132 Eng. Rep. 490, 493 (C.P.
1837) (Tindal, CJ.) (recognizing need for objectively verifiable liability standards); see also
Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609, 615, 249 N.E.2d 419, 422, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554, 558 (1969)
(court lists seven reasons for denying negligence-based recovery for fright without effect, four
of which are clearly process-oriented).
5 Judge Richard Posner, a prominent efficiency theorist, has explored the economics of
process in several essays. See, e.g., Ehrlich & Posner, An Economic Analsis ofLegal Rulemaking, 3
J. LEGAL STUD. 257 (1974); Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure andJudicialAdminis-
tration, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 399 (1973). Lon Fuller, on the other hand, stressed the fairness
elements of process. See L. FULLER, THE MORALrrY OF LAW (1964). On the general subject
of process concerns see H. HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS (Tent. ed. 1958); Dickin-
son, Legal Rules: Their Function in the Process of Decision, 79 U. PA. L. REV. 833 (1931); Dworkin,
The Model ofRules, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 14 (1967); Kennedy, Legal Formality, 2 J. LEGAL STUD.
351 (1973); Leventhal, Environmental Decisionmaking and the Role of the Courts, 122 U. PA. L. REv.
509 (1974).
I attempted something of this sort several years ago, but limited my inquiry to the
problems associated with judicial violations of but one of the process constraints, the fourth
one of manageability. See Henderson, Expanding the Negligence Concept: Retreat From the Rule of
Law, 51 IND. L.J. 467 (1976).
6 Summers, Evaluating and Improving Legal Processes-A Pleafor ' rocess Values," 60 COR-
NELL L. REV. 1 (1974).
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Tort law accomplishes social ends primarily by providing guides to
two different types of behavior: the primary behavior of those persons
whose activities generate the accident costs upon which liability issues
focus, 7 and the adjudicative behavior of the lawyers, judges, and jurors
who have responsibility for officially resolving liability disputes.8 The
first type might be called the "self application" feature of tort law, and
the second type the "official application" feature. The prospective ef-
fects of tort law on primary behavior are of particular concern to effi-
ciency theorists. For them, liability is future-oriented and is justified
primarily because it deters actors from engaging in wastefully hazardous
activities. 9 Fairness theorists, in contrast, emphasize the function of tort
law in providing guides to adjudicative behavior. They believe that
courts are justified in imposing liability on wrongdoers regardless of
whether doing so would affect primary behavior in the future.10
Notwithstanding these differences in emphasis, however, both substan-
tive camps are concerned with the effects of tort law on both primary
and adjudicative behavior. 1
7 Sec, e.g., Ehrlich & Posner, supra note 5, at 261.
8 Ehrlich and Posner refer to this behavior as "legal system behavior." Ehrlich & Pos-
ner, supra note 5, at 264. As used here, "adjudicative behavior" is limited to the in-court
behavior of these actors. When lawyers settle cases out of court, they substitute contract
negotiation for adjudication. This substitution is significant from the process perspective. See
infra notes 30-32.
9 See supra note 2. Professor Fletcher refers to this aspect of efficiency rationales as their
"instrumentalist" feature. See Fletcher, supra note 2, at 538. Professor Calabresi has identi-
fied two instrumentalist effects of tort rules on individual behavior: (1) specific deterrence,
achieved when the rules specifically describe how actors should or should not behave; and
(2) general deterrence, achieved when market decisions are affected by the inclusion of liabil-
ity and liability avoidance costs in the prices of various goods and services. See G. CALABRESI,
supra note 3, at 27.
10 See Fletcher, supra note 2, at 538-39 n.4.
11 Efficiency theorists reflect concern for the effects of tort rules on adjudicative behavior
when they treat those effects as part of the "transaction costs" associated with the tort system.
See Ehrlich & Posner, supra note 5. Although fairness theorists purport to focus on the effects
of tort law on adjudicative behavior, they recognize that liability decisions reflect our views of
the behavior that can be expected from the individuals to whom tort rules apply. Professor
Fletcher thus recognizes the fairness of excusing an actor from liability on the grounds of
unavoidable ignorance:
[T]he question of rationally singling out a party to bear liability becomes a
question of what we can fairly demand of an individual under unusual cir-
cumstances. Assessing the excusability of ignorance . . . can be an instru-
mentalist inquiry. As we increase or decrease our demands, we accordingly
stimulate future behavior. . . . Yet one can also think of excuses as expres-
sions of compassion for human failings in times of stress--expressions that are
thought proper regardless of the impact on other potential risk-creators.
Fletcher, supra note 2, at 553. In this passage, Fletcher translates the "what can we expect of
actors in the future?" concerns of efficiency theorists into a "what can we expect this actor to
have done in the past?" fairness concern. Although Fletcher looks backward rather than
forward, he is concerned with what tort rules can (he would add "fairly") demand of primary
behavior.
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A. The Conditions Necessay for Tort Law to Guide Behavior
The sections that follow first describe the conditions necessary for
tort law to guide both primary and adjudicative behavior, and then de-
rive process constraints to which tort law generally must conform if it is
to perform these functions. Although the underlying assumption is that
tort law guides behavior, 12 no claim is made that it does so inexorably.
Indeed, I am comfortable with assuming significant limits on the effi-
cacy of tort law in these regards.1 3 But if tort law is to play any role in
guiding either primary or adjudicative behavior, the characteristics
about to be described are ones to which rules must generally conform. 14
1. Liability Rules as Guides to Primag Behavior
To the extent that tort law affects primary behavior, it does so by
informing persons of the liabilities imposed for various activities. Some
liability rules describe activities that may result in liability regardless of
the level of care exercised. The rule of manufacturers' strict liability, for
example, holds producers liable for harm caused by defective products
regardless of how carefully they try to avoid defects;15 similarly, a physi-
cian who fails to obtain his patient's consent to non-emergency treat-
ment is liable as an insurer for resulting harm regardless of how skillfully
he acts. 16 Liability rules also describe activities that will not expose ac-
tors to liability regardless of the level of care exercised. These are the
12 Professor Epstein has recently attacked this assumption, at least as it relates to pri-
mary behavior. See Epstein, The Social Consequences of Common Law Rules, 95 HARV. L. REV.
1717 (1982). A careful reading of the article, however, reveals that he is primarily concerned
with the social effects of marginal changes in common law liability rules rather than with the
effects of the tort system in gross.
13 To some extent, of course, individuals to whom rules are addressed are incapable of
responding rationally. In those instances, the only kind of behavior that the rules will affect is
adjudicative behavior. For a recent challenge to the assumption of primary rational behavior
that underlies much of traditional tort commentary, see Rodgers, Neghlgence Reconsidered- The
Role of Rationality in Tort Theo, 54 S. CAL. L. REv. 1 (1980). Even Professor Rodgers agrees
that tort rules can and do affect what he calls "rational" behavior. On the effectiveness of law
as a guide to primary behavior, see L. FRIEDMAN, THE LEGAL SYSTEM: A SOCIAL SCIENCE
PERSPECTIVE 45-136 (1975); H. JONES, THE EFFICACY OF LAW (1969).
14 See in/a text accompanying note 43.
15 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1964). In theory, a producer held
strictly liable for defective products will invest in defect-avoidance measures up to the point of
diminishing returns, and then insure against the liability that predictably will follow from the
defects not worth trying to avoid. As long as the demand for his products is sufficiently great
to allow him to earn a reasonable return on his investment, the producer will continue his
activities and treat the costs of avoiding and insuring against defects as just another cost of
doing business. It should be understood that we are referring here to strict liability for pro-
duction defects. Design defects present very different problems. See generaly Henderson, Re-
newed Judicial Controvery Over Defective Product Design. Toward the Preservation of an Emerging
Consensu, 63 MINN. L. REV. 773 (1979).
16 See W. PROSSER, THE LAw OF TORTS 104 nn.59-63 (4th ed. 1971). The basis of
liability in these cases is battery. For purposes of the present analysis, I include intentional
torts in the first category of activities that bring liability regardless of the care exercised. See
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rules conferring immunity on special categories of actors, such as gov-
ernmental decisionmakers' 7 and parents supervising their minor chil-
dren.18 Finally, liability rules describe the minimum levels of care with
which all other activities must be undertaken to avoid liability for harm
thereby caused. The best examples are those rules imposing general
negligence standards of reasonable care.'9
For tort law to guide effectively decisions on whether and how to
engage in activities creating risks of harm to others, certain conditions
must be met. Some of these conditions do not relate directly to the con-
tent of the liability rules and are of secondary importance in this analy-
sis. Thus, liability rules must be communicated to those whose behavior
is sought to be affected and must remain sufficiently constant through
time to permit rational planning. And the persons to whom the liability
rules are directed must be intelligent enough to understand the rules
and motivated to follow them.
Attention in this article focuses on the conditions to which the lia-
bility rules themselves must conform if they are to affect behavior in the
ways intended. For liability, rules to guide primary behavior, they gen-
erally must conform to the following criteria. First, their clarity must be
such as to enable persons to distinguish between modes of conduct that
will bring liability and modes that will not. Second, they must refer to
factual circumstances that can be objectively verified, so that persons
can apply the rules with some measure of confidence. Finally, to the
extent that the rules describe patterns of behavior to which individuals
are expected to conform, they must avoid calling for behavioral patterns
that are not achievable by those to whom the rules are directed. 20
2. Liabiity Rules as Guides to Adjudicative Behavior
The need for clarity, verifiability, and conformability in liability
rules is just as important here as it is in the primary-behavior context.21
generally Meisel, The Expansion of Liability for Medical Accidents: From Negligence to Strict Liability
By Way Of Infonmed Consent, 56 NEB. L. REv. 51 (1977).
17 See generaly Borchard, Governmental Responsibility in Tort, 36 YALE L.J. 1, 757, 1039
(1926), 28 COLUM. L. REv. 577, 734 (1928); Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, 34 YALE
L.J. 1, 129, 221 (1924).
18 See infra notes 108-12 and accompanying text.
19 Seegeneral4' W. PRossER, supra note 16, at 139-204. It is important to observe that in
theory the rules governing liability for negligent conduct are designed so that rational actors
will avoid liability. See generaly Posner, supra note 1.
20 The first and third conditions closely parallel two of the conditions described by Lon
Fuller as necessary for rules to govern conduct. See L. FULLER, supra note 5, at 38-39. Fuller's
other conditions are not included here because they concern aspects of process other than the
content of the rules. These include, for example, the requirements that rules be publicized
and that they not be changed too frequently. Id at 39. Fuller surprisingly does not address
the concerns reflected in the second condition described in the text, except as they may be
reflected in his eighth condition that official conduct must be consistent with the rules. Id
21 In trying to predict their liability exposure, individual actors look for guidance to the
1982]
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Judges and juries must be able to understand the rules, to verify the
facts relevant to their application, and to conform to the relevant proce-
dural requirements. But the shift in context introduces one significant,
complicating factor-reliance upon the adjudicative process of decision.
As it is used here, adjudication refers to the traditional process by which
interested parties present proofs and arguments before an impartial ju-
dicial tribunal, urging that the applicable rules of decision, when ap-
plied to the proven facts, entitle them to a favorable result. 22 New
adjudicative forms have evolved in recent years, most notably in areas of
public law, that deviate significantly from this traditional model. 23
Consideration of these new forms of adjudication, however, is beyond
the scope of this analysis. This article will focus on traditional adjudica-
tion because tort law is a body of law that has been generated by, and
that still presupposes, a traditional adjudicatory model.
The key to understanding the traditional process of adjudication is
to appreciate the significance of the litigants' right of participation in
reaching a decision.24 At the level of primary behavior, exposure to lia-
bility pressures an actor to weigh the interests of others more than he
might otherwise do. He is not, however, ordinarily required to invite
those who may be adversely affected to come in and plead their cases
before him.2 5 He may consult others before he acts, but he need not do
so. Whether or not he consults those directly affected, the actor relies on
his own judgment and intuition in attempting to reach an appropriate
decision. 26 In contrast, traditional adjudication presupposes that per-
patterns of liability that emerge from the applications of tort rules in court, rather than sim-
ply to the rules themselves.
22 See Fuller, Collective Bargaining and the Arbitrator, 1963 Wis. L. REV. 3, 19.
23 See generaly D. HOROWITZ, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY (1977); Chayes, The
Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1976); Diver, The Judge As
Political Powerbroker: Superintending Structural Change in Public hnstitutions, 65 VA. L. REV. 43
(1979); Eisenberg & Yeazell,, The Ordinafy and the Extraordinar
, 
in Institutional Litigation, 98
HARv. L. REV. 465 (1980); Note, Complex Enforcement Unconstitutional Prison Conditions, 94
HARv. L. REV. 626 (1981).
24 See Fuller, The Fonns and Limits ofAdjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 364 (1978). But
see Fiss, Foreword. The Forms ofJustice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 39-44 (1979).
25 Legislatures and administrative agencies are the only significant exceptions. For dis-
cussion of the extent to which administrative agencies are required to hold public hearings
before they act nonadjudicatively, see Friendly, Some KindofHearing, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267
(1975); Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARv. L. REV. 1667 (1975).
Whenever an individual actor's liability depends on obtaining the consent of those affected by
his conduct, his exposure to liability compels the actor to involve them in the decision process.
Thus, before a physician performs nonemergency surgery, he must obtain the informed con-
sent of the patient. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. But even in this context the
extent to which the patient actually participates in the decisions relevant to the treatment is
limited. In the broader context of tort liability generally, when actors and victims have no
opportunities to identify one another ahead of time, ex ante participation by those adversely
affected is nonexistent.
26 Thus, even if the actor is an administrative agency, so long as it is not acting through
formal adjudication, it is free, both de facto and dejure, to exercise significant discretion in its
[Vol. 67:901
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sons whose interests will be directly affected by a decision are guaran-
teed an opportunity to participate in the decisionmaking process, for the
court must take into consideration their proofs and arguments. 27 It fol-
lows that for liability rules to support these adjudicatory endeavors, the
rules must require that the relevant facts are likely to be verifiable by
objective evidence, and that the issues for decision be arranged so that
they may be addressed, considered, and decided in an orderly sequence.
The first of these requirements, verifiability, parallels the require-
ment in the context of primary behavior that liability rules refer to fac-
tual circumstances that are objectively verifiable. In contrast, the
second requirement, orderly consideration of the issues, is unique and
deserves further elaboration. The best way to understand the need for
liability rules to clarify the issues to be argued and decided through ad-
judication is to examine the kinds of problems that only extrajudicial
decisionmakers are capable of solving. Many of the day-to-day plan-
ning problems that confront individuals require the weighing and bal-
ancing of interrelated elements and considerations. In the absence of a
rule making one or two factors determinative, a diverse range of factors
must be considered. Moreover, these factors tend to be related to each
other in ways that require most or all of them to be re-evaluated as each
is considered in turn. 28 These problems, often called "polycentric," 29
are capable of being solved by a person exercising managerial discre-
tion-the decision process that individuals employ in planning their
day-to-day activities.30 Planning problems lend themselves to being
"mulled over" and are usually solved by intuitional exercises of discre-
tion. Relying on a combination of experience and intuition, skillful
managers are able to reach sensible conclusions in a fairly high percent-
age of instances. 31
decisionmaking. See Nathanson, Probing the Mind of the Administrator: Hearing Variations and
Standards ofJudicial Review Under the Administrative Procedure Act and Other Federal Statutes, 75
COLUM. L. REV. 721, 754-55 (1975).
27 For discussion of the limited extent to which courts may exercise discretion in the
context of traditional adjudication, see Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 14
(1967); Greenawalt, Discretion andJudicial Decision: The Elusive Quest for the Fetters that Bind
judges, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 359 (1975).
28 Selecting a living room rug is an example of such a task. Many factors are relevant to
the decision: size, color, shape, design, texture, price, etc. And all are mutually interdepen-
dent-one's initial reaction to the texture, for example, may require adjustment as one fo-
cuses on the color and design, and subsequent adjustment when one balances the texture,
color and design against the price. In the end, the best "rug pickers" are those with the best
intuitions.
29 See Fuller, supra note 24, at 394-404.
30 Id at 398. Another important process by which polycentric problems are solved is
contract negotiation between interested parties. Id at 399.
31 'Managers can and frequently do rely on rules. If the rules are "rules of thumb," the
problems retain their polycentric character and the manager relies largely on intuition in
applying them. If the rules are formal and specific, they will reduce the polycentricity of the
problems facing the manager. See inqfa note 36 and accompanying text.
1982]
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These polycentric planning problems, however, cannot be ad-
dressed effectively by the traditional adjudicatory process. Mutually in-
terdependent factors can be assessed only by an ongoing process that
permits tentative reactions to be reconsidered and altered in light of ad-
ditional factors. Traditional forms of adjudication do not allow for such
an approach to decisionmaking. Each litigant is promised the opportu-
nity to rely on rules that, he can argue, not only support but require the
result that he urges on the court. It follows that the rules of decision
must reduce the mutual interdependency of the issues so that the af-
fected parties can offer proofs and render arguments in an orderly se-
quence. Legal rules must, in effect, "depolycentrize" planning problems
by addressing and resolving the major policy questions ahead of time at
the rule making stage, leaving a manageable number of related but not
highly interdependent facts and circumstances to be determined at the
rule-application stage.32 For rules to perform this function they must be
somewhat specific and, if the underlying problems are complex, rela-
tively complicated. By hypothesis, legal rules will not render complex
planning problems adjudicable if they confront courts with open-ended
questions such as "what solution would be reasonable under all the rele-
vant circumstances? '33
It will help clarify this concept to consider what would happen if a
court employing the traditional process of adjudication were to address
a complex planning problem without the aid of adequately specific rules
of decision. Suppose a court were to entertain a claim for damages
based upon the argument that the defendant municipality had negli-
gently failed to provide reasonable police protection, causing the crime
rate to rise and the value of the plaintiffs home to fall. In the absence of
some standard more definite than "reasonableness," 34 the plaintiff
would be asking the court to judge the city's police budget by hypotheti-
cally designing an alternative plan for the collection and disbursement
of municipal revenues for police protection. 35 The size of a reasonable
32 When courts engage in rule making, they arguably exceed the limits of adjudication.
Several considerations, however, make this judicial activity necessary and legitimate. First,
courts engage only in incremental rule making. This helps to reduce the open-endedness of
the issues. In rare instances when judges attempt to derive complex rules "out of wholecloth,"
they are rightly criticized. Second, judicial rule-making efforts are subject to review on ap-
peal and in subsequent decisions. This does not reduce the polycentricity, but it does provide
additional opportunities to address the policy issues in other judicial forums, thereby decreas-
ing the likelihood of the rules being influenced by the decisionmakers' individual biases.
33 Indeed, such a "rule" would not properly be described by that term, but would more
properly be called a "standard." See Ehrlich & Posner, supra note 5, at 258-61.
34 A more specific rule might be available. For example, the city charter might require
certain expenditures, and the budget could be declared unlawful without them; or perhaps
the court would adopt as a legal standard the average expenditure figure for cities of compa-
rable size.
35 The court in such a case would not be asked to design a new budget for the city, of
course, but would merely be asked to decide whether the existing budget was reasonable.
[Vol. 67:901
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police budget can only be determined in light of the city's needs and
resources. Even assuming that the size of a "reasonable" budget could
be determined, albeit tentatively, it next would be necessary to address
the question: "How should a budget for police reasonably be allo-
cated?" This polycentric question could, in turn, only be answered by
weighing a number of considerations, including the comparative needs
of various parts of the community, the available means of meeting those
needs, and the relationships among the various needs and means.
As the parties in such a case progressed to questions of the sizes and
numbers of police shifts, it would be necessary to consider not only more
specific questions such as "patrol cars versus foot patrols," but also to
return repeatedly to the fundamental question of a "reasonable
budget." Without more specific rules of decision, no sooner would one
side complete its proofs and arguments on the various issues involved
than it would be required to replicate the entire process, with appropri-
ate adjustments, in response to countervailing proofs and arguments by
the other side.36
It should be emphasized that the sorts of problems presented in this
hypothetical do not defy rational solution. To the contrary, planning
techniques are available with which competent city managers are able
to approximate, if not achieve, optimal allocations of municipal re-
sources. 37 Likewise, the persons who become judges are not necessarily
incompetent managers, and courts would not invariably make fools of
themselves or self-destruct if they were to entertain actions of the sort
just described. Indeed, as has already been observed, courts relying on
new forms of adjudication are with increasing frequency entertaining
Implicit in such a review, however, would be the necessity of deciding how a minimally rea-
sonable budget would have been drawn up.
36 Trials are not typically structured to accommodate such "back and forth" argumen-
tation. Thus, in our hypothetical case the litigants would be forced into a two-step process in
which the plaintiff, and then the defendant, would present his side. This would not solve the
difficulties associated with polycentric problem solving; it would merely deny their existence
by fiat. Each side could be expected to try to adjust his arguments to reflect alternatives
likely to be presented by the other. For example, the plaintiff would argue: "Now, the de-
fendant may answer my first point with this argument. . . . If he does, I reply as follows
... . On the other hand, if he takes a different approach, I will counter by going back and
adjusting my position on an earlier issue." Denied the opportunity to address the polycentric
problem as it should be addressed, in the "back and forth" manner usually associated with
negotiation, the parties would adjust as much as possible. To the extent that adjustment
became impossible, the litigants would be denied the opportunity to participate meaningfully
in the adjudicative process. Not surprisingly, the so-called "new" forms of adjudication devel-
oped in recent years, by means of which courts address extremely polycentric social planning
problems, allow for the sort of "back and forth" negotiations described here. See Chayes, supra
note 23, at 1298-1302.
37 See generaly PUBLIC EXPENDITURES AND POLICY ANALYSIS (R. Haveman & J. Mar-
golis eds. (1970); E. QUADE, ANALYSIS FOR PUBLIC DE)IsIONS (1975); E. STOKEY & R.
ZECKHAUSER, A PRIMER FOR POLICY ANALYSIS (1978).
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public-law claims somewhat analogous to the one just described. 38
If a court were to entertain the hypothetical negligence claim de-
scribed above, 39 however, it would be forced to depart from the tradi-
tional adjudicative model and would be compelled to substitute a
management model in its place. The parties to such an action would be
given their "day in court" in that they would be heard. Participation in
the manner described earlier, however, would not be possible. The liti-
gants would not be able to invoke rules that they could claim entitle
them to a favorable decision as a matter of right. They would be forced
instead to approach the court as supplicants, hoping to impress the
judge or jury with elements in the matrix favorable to their side.40 In
the end, after the parties had rested on their proofs and arguments, the
decisionmaker (judge or jury) would "mull over" the problem and re-
solve it by the intuitional exercise of discretion. The result reached in a
given instance might be sensible enough, depending on the particular
decisionmaker's managerial skills. But it would be a result reached by a
management process and not by adjudication. 41
If parties are to participate meaningfully in the adjudication of tort
cases, rather than merely as supplicants before disinterested managers,
liability must structure the issues so that each important aspect can be
addressed and resolved without the necessity of continuous reconsidera-
tion and reevaluation in light of subsequent developments in the course
38 See supra note 23. The new forms of adjudication are concerned primarily with struc-
tural reforms in public institutions rather than recovery of money damages. Thus, a court
might entertain a class action brought to reorganize a corrupt police department.
39 The court probably would not entertain such a claim. First, the plaintiff probably
would be barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity because he is attacking discretionary,
policy-level decisions. See supra note 17. Second, courts generally do not allow recovery in
tort for economic harm. See, e.g., In re Kinsman Transit Co., 388 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1968);
Stevenson v. East Ohio Gas Co., 47 Ohio L. Abs. 586, 73 N.E.2d 200 (1946). But see Union
Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 1974) (commercial fishermen recover damages from
oil companies for negligent diminution of aquatic life caused by oil spill). Both of these tradi-
tional limitations on exposure to liability reflect significant process concerns.
40 Given these open-ended planning problems in the absence of a more specific standard
than "reasonableness," all that a litigant could impress upon judge and jury would be slogans
such as "police protection is a citizen's right" or "we shouldn't interfere with the city council's
judgment."
41 Several writers in recent years have argued that such judicially-implemented manage-
ment decisions constitute legitimate new forms of adjudication. See supra note 23. I agree that
these new processes might be legitimate when they are limited to suits seeking injunctive relief
in the public law sector. Whether legitimate or not in the context of public law, judges act as
managers in those cases; devising a new label such as "consultative process" does not alter the
fact that the parties in such cases are appealing to the exercise of managerial discretion. See
Eisenberg, Participation, Responsiveness, and the Consultative Process: An Essay for Lon Fuller, 92
H~av. L. REV. 410 (1978). Moreover, such 'judicial management" techniques are not legiti-
mate in the private law setting of the hypothetical. The plaintiff in such a case should take
his complaint to the city council, not the court, for council members are the managers who
may legitimately exercise the politicial judgments he demands.
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of proof and argument at trial.42 For tort law to perform this function
effectively, polycentric social planning problems must be addressed in
advance at the rulemaking stage; such problems cannot be relegated to
case-by-case resolution.
B. Process Constraints Derivable From the Ways in Which Liability Rules
Guide Pr'mag, and Adjudicative Behavior
The preceding description of the conditions necessary for liability
rules to guide both primary and adjudicative behavior suggests the pro-
cess constraints to which tort law generally must conform. These con-
straints are not absolute; they must be balanced against each other and
against the substantive objectives they are intended to complement. 43
But within their proper bounds, these constraints impose requirements
to which tort law must conform if it is to provide meaningful guides to
conduct.
1. The First Process Constraint: Comprehensibility
For liability rules to guide either primary or adjudicative behavior
effectively, they must be comprehensible to the persons whose behavior
they seek to affect. Regarding the effect of tort law on primary behav-
ior, rules defining the activities to which strict liability or immunity at-
tach should describe these activities specifically enough to permit actors
to determine with some accuracy when to expect such special treat-
ment.44 Vagueness need not be avoided at all costs; some generality in
liability rules is not only unavoidable but also desirable.4 5 Liability
rules that describe the levels of care governing various activities, such as
42 Each level of argument, of course, will be influenced by those preceding it. However,
the parties can accommodate their arguments to the two-step structure imposed by proce-
dural rules, as long as subsequent elements do not require reconsideration of prior elements.
43 The manner in which this balancing is carried out will depend on the view taken
toward the objectives of fairness and efficiency. An efficiency theorist would treat violations
of the process constraints as generating costs to be considered in his equations leading to
optimal resource allocations. A fairness proponent would treat such violations as introducing
elements of unfairness and inequity, to be considered along with the fairness effects of the
substantive content of tort rules. Because this analysis does not attempt to reconcile fairness
and efficiency rationales, it will not attempt to work out the method for balancing process
concerns against each other or against substantive concerns. On the subject of the relation-
ship between the process norms and the substantive norms of fairness and efficiency, see infia
text accompanying notes 69-74.
44 For example, RESrATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) applies strict manu-
facturer's liability only to product sellers "engaged in the business of selling such a product [as
that which harmed the plaintiff]." Although the boundaries of strict products liability have
been extended in recent years, courts have tried to specify the new boundaries so that actors
can determine their applications ahead of time. See generally Henderson, Extending the Bounda-
ries of Stict Products Liability: Implications of the Theoy of the Second Best, 128 U. PA. L. REV.
1036, 1042-59 (1980).
45. For an analysis by efficiency theorists of optimal levels of rule specificity, see Ehrlich
& Posner, su/ra note 5.
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the general negligence standard, need not be specific. Boundary clarifi-
cation will be needed if significantly different levels of care are required
for various categories of activities. 46 But within any given category, the
level of care may and probably must be described in more open-ended
terms.4 7 As long as the language employed incorporates generally un-
derstood normative principles48 and is accompanied by more specific
elaborations that can function as benchmarks, 49 liability rules can ade-
quately serve to guide primary behavior in most circumstances.5 0
Vague standards are not the only threat to comprehensibility in the
context of primary behavior. Rules also lack sufficient clarity because of
complexity, or ambiguity. Complexity is the counterpart to vagueness;
just as tort law can be too indefinite to serve as a guide to primary con-
duct, it can also be too complicatedly specific.5 1 Ambiguity becomes a
problem when a rule of decision reasonably can be interpreted by differ-
ent actors to refer to different circumstances. This is likely to occur, for
example, whenever a liability rule purports to take into account the sub-
jective psychological predispositions of individual actors. Such a rule
could be misinterpreted to invite actors to apply their own values as well
as their own mental capacities.5 2 Rules couched in "do your best"
46 For example, courts generally hold infants to a lower standard of care. See, e.g.,
Charbonneau v. MacRury, 84 N.H. 501, 153 A. 457 (1931); W. PROSSER, supra note 16, at
154-57. However, children engaged in "adult activities" are often judged by an adult stan-
dard. See, e.g., Daniels v. Evans, 107 N.H. 407, 224 A.2d 63 (1966); W. PROSSER, supra note
16, at 156-57. Similarly, common carriers often are held to a higher standard of care. See,
e.g., Mobile Cab & Baggage Co. v. Busby, 277 Ala. 292, 169 So. 2d 314 (1964) ("highest"
care); Barrie v. Central R.R., 71 N.J. Super. 587, 177 A.2d 568 (1962) ("very high" standard
of care). In these cases, as in the "adult activities" cases, the courts have defined as a matter
of law what constitutes a "common carrier." See Burnett v. Riter, 276 S.W. 347 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1925).
47 One of the best-known expressions of the need for vagueness in general standards of
conduct is Justice Cardozo's majority opinion in Pokora v. Wabash Ry., 292 U.S. 98 (1934).
48 An example of a vague but comprehensible legal standard is the general negligence
standard of reasonable care. See injra note 86 and accompanying text.
49 Examples of court-made benchmarks include the common law rules governing the
liability of possessors of land to various categories of entrants. Examples of legislated
benchmarks include safety statutes, violations of which are treated as negligence per se. See,
e.g., Martin v. Herzog, 228 N.Y. 164, 126 N.E. 814 (1920); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 288B (1965).
50 Again, I am not insisting that tort rules necessarily succeed in guiding primary behav-
ior in all, or even most, instances. See sura note 13.
51 The common law rules governing the liability of possessors of land have been criti-
cized for being too complicated. The common law rules governing liability for defamation
have been similarly criticized. See Veeder, The Histoqy and Theory of the Law of Defamation, 3
COLUM. L. REv. 546 (1903).
More serious comprehensibility problems arise outside the torts field. In antitrust and
securities litigation, for example, some cases have become so complex that judges have refused
to allow the cases to be tried before a jury. See, e.g., ILC Peripherals v. IBM, 458 F. Supp. 423
(N.D. Cal. 1978), afd, 636 F.2d 1188 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 972 (1981); Bernstein v.
Universal Pictures, Inc., 79 F.R.D. 59 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). But see In re United States Fin. Sec.
Litigation, 609 F.2d 411 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 929 (1980).
52 As will be seen, this source of misunderstanding represents a common thread running
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terms, which elsewhere have been labeled "aspirational," are especially
likely to be misunderstood in this manner.53
Comprehensibility is also required in the adjudicative context. The
negative effects of vagueness in this regard will be discussed later; consis-
tent with the earlier analysis of the difficulties posed by polycentric
problems, vagueness in rules of decision presents courts with difficulties
that transcend incomprehensibility. 54 Of interest here are the negative
effects caused by liability rules that are either too complicated or too
ambiguous to be understood by participants in the adjudicative process.
Although specificity is, within limits, desirable and necessary as a means
of avoiding highly polycentric disputes, when taken too far liability rules
can become incomprehensible even to competent lawyers, judges, and
jurors.
2. The Second Process Constraint: Veriflability
If liability rules refer to facts and circumstances that cannot be ob-
jectively verified by the persons whose primary conduct is sought to be
modified, accurate predictions of liability cannot be made and the rules
will fail to guide behavior. Consider, for example, a liability rule that
tells an actor that he is legally privileged to touch another person only if
the other person actually desires to be touched. Regardless of what the
other person says or does indicating such a desire, in many circum-
stances the actor cannot verify whether consent has been given and thus
cannot predict the liability effects of intentionally touching others.55
Two sources of difficulty must be considered regarding the rele-
vance of the verifiability constraint in the adjudicative context. First, if
litigants are to have an opportunity to present proofs in support of their
arguments, liability rules must refer to facts that can in most instances
be verified objectively. Obviously, no set of liability rules can avoid evi-
dentiary gaps in all cases; instances are bound to occur in which no wit-
nesses are available to testify regarding events and circumstances crucial
to the outcome.56 But some factual circumstances, such as the subjective
through this analysis. See, e.g., infia notes 89, 155 and accompanying text. Although the
difficulties of trying to separate an actor's mental capacity from his value structure have
received relatively little attention in connection with tort law, they have received a great deal
of attention in connection with the insanity defense in criminal law. See injra note 205.
53 See generally Henderson & Pearson, Implementing Federal Environmental Policies: The Limits
ofAspirational Commands, 78 COLUM. L. REv. 1429 (1978).
54 See supra notes 29-42 and accompanying text.
55 Perhaps for this reason a plaintiff who manifests a willingness to be touched physi-
cally will be held to have consented to being touched. See O'Brien v. Cunard S.S. Co., 154
Mass. 272, 28 N.E. 266 (1891).
56 Courts have dealt with the problem of gaps in proof in different ways. Often, circum-
stantial evidence is admitted from which the jury is allowed to infer certain facts. See, e.g.,
Hoyt v. Jeffers, 30 Mich. 181 (1874). In addition, the burdens of production and persuasion,
set by the courts, often dispose of cases in which gaps exist. Perhaps the best known device for
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mental events described above, are predictably nonverifiable in a high
enough percentage of cases that, whenever possible, liability rules should
avoid having outcomes depend on their occurrence.57
Second, courts must try to avoid hypothetical "what would have
happened if. . . ?" questions in the course of resolving tort disputes.
When such hypotheticals are addressed in adjudication, attention fo-
cuses on events that never occurred and circumstances that never ex-
isted. If liability rules require answers to such questions, proof gives way
to speculation. Of course, to some extent these questions are unavoida-
ble in connection with issues such as proximate cause58 and damages.59
But the verifiability constraint requires that liability rules avoid raising
such questions whenever possible.
3. The Third Process Constraint: Conformabilioy
Consistent with their function of guiding both primary and adjudi-
cative behavior, liability rules should avoid calling for behavior patterns
to which persons are incapable of conforming. 60 A clear violation of this
constraint would be a rule mandating performance of certain acts and
requiring levels of care and skill that most persons could not attain.61
Rules leaving to the individual the decision whether or not to engage in
activities are less likely to cause problems, even if they set high standards
of care and skill. Of course, the choices open to actors must be meaning-
ful. If actors who lack the requisite abilities can avoid liability only by
becoming recluses or by leaving the jurisdiction, then even a rule that
purports to give them the choice of whether or not to act will be open to
legitimate criticism for violating the conformability constraint.
The discussion so far has focused on liability rules that describe the
level of care and skill with which activities must be undertaken. Is the
dealing with gaps in proof is the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. The doctrine permits the jury
to infer the defendant's negligence from the facts of the case, even when the negligent act
cannot be clearly identified. See, e.g., Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal. 2d 486, 154 P.2d 687
(1944). See generally Prosser, The Procedural Effect of Res Ipsa Loquitor, 20 MINN. L. REV. 241
(1936). On the subject of circumstantial proof and judicial reliance on probabilities, see gen-
erally Finkelstein & Fairley, A Bayesian Approach to Identification Evidence, 83 HARv. L. REV. 489
(1970); Tribe, Trial By Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 HARv. L. REV.
1329 (1971).
57 See infra note 84 and accompanying text.
58 Or the use of hypothetical questions for the issue of proximate cause, see ina notes
92-96 and accompanying text.
59 Regarding the use of hypothetical questions in connection with the damages issue, see
Leubsdorf, Remedies for Uncertainty, 61 B.U.L. REv. 132 (1981).
60 See L. FULLER, supra note 5, at 70-76.
61 Professor Fuller describes strict criminal liability as "the most serious infringement of
the principle that the law should not command the impossible." Id at 77. Strict tort liability
is different in this respect: Rules of strict criminal liability are aimed at modifying conduct
directly; rules of strict tort liability usually reflect indifference regarding whether the actor
acts, and can be viewed as "activity taxes." See supra note 15 and accompanying text; infia
note 63 and accompanying text.
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conformability constraint also relevant in connection with rules impos-
ing strict liability? The answer here might appear to be in the negative
in as much as strict liability rules neither require action nor specify the
manner in which activities must be undertaken. Viewed in this way,
strict liability operates in much the same way as an "activity tax," indif-
ferent to whether one acts or refrains from acting. One conforms to a
strict liability rule by paying the appropriate damages assessed after the
event.62 The legitimacy of strict liability as an indirect guide to primary
behavior, however, is premised on an assumption that persons are free,
in a meaningful sense of the word, to choose whether or not to engage in
the activities to which such "taxes" attach.63 It follows that whenever
strict tort liability is imposed on persons who are not free to choose
whether or not to engage in the relevant activities, the function of the
strict liability rule as an indirect guide to primary behavior is impaired
and the spirit of the conformability constraint is violated.
64
Conformability also is relevant in the adjudicative context. Were a
judge to require a jury to make specific findings based on a trial record
that did not rationally support the findings requested, he would be call-
ing for behavior to which the jurors would, as rational beings, be inca-
pable of conforming. Courts traditionally have avoided such difficulties
by resolving disputes against litigants who fail to carry their burden of
production.65 If, in the name of overriding policy considerations, jurors
were required to make findings that were not rationally supported by
the evidence, problems associated with this third process constraint
would arise.66
62 Intentional torts, which I earlier grouped with strict liability rules, see supra note 16,
do not reflect indifference to whether the actor conforms. The rules governing intentional
torts are designed so that it is always in a rational actor's interest to avoid liability. See supra
note 19.
63 The theory underlying strict products liability is based on the assumption that produ-
cers are free to choose whether or not to produce and consumers are free to choose whether or
not to consume. See supra notes 11, 16.
64 Thus, courts have refused to hold producers strictly liable for harm caused by a prod-
uct when the aspect causing the harm was mandated by a government contract. See, e.g.,
Hunt v. Blasius, 55 Ill. App. 3d 14, 20, 370 N.E.2d 617, 621-22 (1977). In contrast to tort
liability rules, rules imposing true taxes need not be so concerned with whether the persons
being taxed are free to choose whether or not to engage in the taxed activities. Tax rules may
be concerned with incentive effects, but they need not be.
65 See supra note 56.
66 An illustrative case is Anderson v. Somberg, 67 N.J. 291, 338 A.2d 1, cert. denied, 423
U.S. 929 (1975), a products liability case in which the jury was instructed to render a verdict
against one or more of the four defendants-the manufacturer, the distributor, the hospital or
surgeon--despite knowledge that the harm might have arisen from other sources. Judge
Mountain dissented, stating-
Note, first, the role the jury is being called upon to play. The judge will give
to the jury two potentially contradictory instructions. First the jurors will be
told to arrive at a verdict by a preponderance of the evidence, each defendant
having the burden of exculpating himself. Then a further direction will be
given that they must bring in a verdict against some one or more of the de-
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4. The Fourth Process Constraint: Manageability
The manageability constraint relates only to adjudicative behavior.
As explained earlier, for tort disputes to be resolvable by traditional
forms of adjudication, the rules of decision generally must avoid present-
ing courts with highly complex, polycentric problems. Complex dis-
putes are those involving many points of decision; they become
polycentric if the relevant points of decision not only increase in number
but also become mutually interdependent in the manner described ear-
lier.67 If liability rules are to support litigants' reasoned arguments, they
must not only limit the number of issues to be addressed but also sepa-
rate the significant considerations and arrange them so that they can be
addressed in an orderly sequence. The rules must be specific to some
extent. Liability rules will violate the manageability constraint if they
present courts with social planning problems to be solved on a case-by-
case basis.68
fendants. But suppose the members of the jury cannot agree that the evi-
dence will sustain a verdict against any defendant. What then! Each juror
has taken an oath-no small matter-to reach a verdict only 'according to the
evidence.' What does he now do?
Id. at 311, 338 A.2d at 11 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
67 See supra notes 28-42 and accompanying text.
68 One should observe that, in general, negligence cases involving multiple parties are
more likely to present manageability problems than are bipolar cases with only one party on
each side. See generally Chayes, supra note 23, at 1281-84, 1289-92. Increasing the number of
parties tends to render negligence cases less manageable in two ways. First, it tends to in-
crease the number of separate interests that must be accommodated and thus tends to render
the dispute more complex and polycentric. The best descriptions of the complexities intro-
duced by multiplicity of parties appear in recent treatments of the new forms of public law
adjudication. Describing a typical school desegregation case, Professor Fiss observes: "In
[cases arising within these new adjudicative models] the typical pattern is to find a great
number of spokesmen, each perhaps representing different views as to what is in the interest
of the victim group. . . .The multiplicity of spokesmen does not create these differences [in
viewpoint]. They exist in the real world, and the court must hear from all before it can decide
what the ideal of racial equality requires." Fiss, supra note 24, at 21. Second, even if the
interests on each side are sufficiently identical to permit one spokesman to speak for all, the
procedural device by which one spokesman is allowed to represent multiple parties is the class
action. Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which governs the use of class
actions in the federal courts, requires "questions of law or fact common to the members of the
class [that] predominate over any questions affecting only individual members." FED. R.
Civ. P. 23(b)(3). Rule 23 also suggests that courts consider the difficulties associated with
managing the class action before certifying the class. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)(D). These
considerations reflect a recognition of the process difficulties inherent in multi-party litiga-
tion. See generalv Developments in the Law: Class Actions, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1318, 1351-52
(1976) and authorities cited therein. For an example of what can result when a class action
becomes too large for the courts to manage, see Gwathmey v. United States, 215 F.2d 148,
154 (5th Cir. 1954) (denial of due process when jury permitted to decide value of 238 tracts of
realty after reviewing "incredible volume of figures and general data"). That many people
have a direct stake in the outcome tends to transform the dispute into the type of social
planning problem that traditional forms of adjudication should try to avoid. Professor
Chayes has observed: "I think it unlikely that the class action will ever be taught to behave in
accordance with the precepts of the traditional model of adjudication. The class suit is a
reflection of our growing awareness that a host of important public and private interactions
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C. Relation Between Process Constraints and Objectives of Fairness and
Ejtieng
Although this article will not attempt to reconcile the various fair-
ness and efficiency rationales claimed to underlie our traditional tort
liability system, it is useful to consider how the process constraints relate
to these objectives. With relatively little effort, the preceding analysis
could be translated into the terminology of efficiency theorists. For ex-
ample, the problems associated with vagueness and complexity in tort
rules could be dealt with in terms of the tort system trying to achieve
optimal levels of rule specificity-levels at which more or less specificity
would generate unnecessary social costs.6 9 And the verifiability con-
straint could be treated in terms of the necessity for tort law to avoid
imposing unnecessarily high information costs on those whose behavior
it seeks to modify.70
The process constraints are also consistent with recognized fairness
principles. As will be discussed below in connection with the traditional
no-general-duty-to-rescue rule, the constraints of comprehensibility, ver-
ifiability, and conformability have a strong moral content in their appli-
cation to primary behavior. Thus, it is not only inefficient to penalize
an individual for failing to conform to an unclear rule, a rule referring
to nonverifiable factual circumstances, or a rule that asks the impossi-
ble-it is also unfair.7 ' In addition, the process constraints reflect fair-
ness concerns in their application to adjudicative behavior. Liability
rules should support meaningful litigant participation in tort disputes
because it would be unfair to renege on the system's promise to litigants
that they will be given this opportunity.
Even though the process constraints are consistent with fairness and
efficiency principles, I would resist attempts to reduce them entirely to
these substantive theories. Instead, drawing upon the work of Professors
Lon Fuller72 and Robert Summers,73 I suggest that the process con-
straints rest on an independent base. Regarding the effects of liability
rules on primary behavior, the process constraints are rooted in notions
of the dignity and responsibility of human individuals. Reliance on self-
... can no longer be visualized as bilateral transactions between private individuals."
Chayes, supra, at 1291.
69 See generaly Ehrlich & Posner, supra note 5.
70 See generally Calabresi & Hirschoff, Toward a Testfor Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE
LJ. 1055 (1972), in which the authors propose that tort liability be imposed on the "cheapest
cost avoider"--that is, the person who can most cheaply acquire information upon which to
make a cost-benefit analysis and can most efficiently act on that analysis. Clearly, rules that
refer to factual circumstances that cannot be verified by the addressees threaten to impose
liability on persons who are not effective cost-avoiders.
71 Lon Fuller's work reflects the fairness content of the first three process constraints. See
L. FULLER, supra note 5. Professor Fletcher's writing does as well. See supra note 11.
72 See L. FULLER, sura note 5; Fuller, supra notes 22, 24.
73 See Summers, supra note 6. See generally L. FULLER, supra note 5, at 162-67.
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applying rules of conduct presupposes that the persons to whom the
rules are addressed are intelligent enough to understand the rules and
responsible enough to conform their conduct to them. Any system pur-
porting to rely on self-applying rules of behavior that came to be charac-
terized by widespread violations of these constraints would not simply
be inefficient and unfair-it could no longer claim to be governed by the
rule of law.74
In the adjudicative context, the process constraints reflect the sig-
nificance traditionally attached to the right of those affected by the rules
to participate meaningfully in their official application. This commit-
ment to a participatory mode of rule application reinforces the view of
individual responsibility in the context of primary behavior. Whether
one implication of this analysis is that traditional forms of adjudication
should continue to dominate the tort system is not clear. But as long as
the commitment to adjudication remains in force, widespread violations
of the process constraints represent an erosion of the integrity of the le-
gal process.
II
EXAMINING TRADITIONAL TORT DOCTRINE FROM A
PROCESS PERSPECTIVE: A HISTORICAL
OVERVIEW
Obviously the early common law rules conformed to the process
constraints. These early liability rules, which were the underpinnings of
modern tort law, not only reflected but also were derived from the for-
mal processes of adjudication in the King's courts. 75 These processes
were based upon a strict bipolar mode in which the issues for decision
were limited to those of the nonpolycentric, "what happened?" vari-
ety.76 This sharp narrowing of focus was accomplished by limiting
rights of access to the King's courts to those claims for relief specifically
described in formal writs issued for the purpose of summoning defend-
ants to court. 77 Two of the limited number of King's writs related to
what today would be considered tortious conduct: the writs of trespass
74 This point is central to the analysis in this article. The process constraints are the
conditions that rules generally must satisfy if they are to govern conduct. They do not assure
that the tort system will achieve fairness or efficiency; substantive norms must help to deter-
mine the content of the rules to achieve those objectives. But even if rule makers are sincerely
bent on achieving a fair and efficient tort system they will fail, as Fuller's hypothetical mon-
arch failed, unless they conform generally to the process constraints. Se L. FULLER, supra
note 5, at 33-38.
75 See generally J.. KOFFLER & A. REPPY, COMMON LAW PLEADING 32-35 (1969); R.
POUND, THE HISTORY AND SYSTEM OF THE COMMON LAW 129 (1939).
76 See generaly H. STEPHEN, A TREATISE ON THE PRINCIPLES OF PLEADING IN CIVIL
AcTIONS 149-57, 340 (1882); Chayes, supra note 23, at 1282.
77 Segeneralo J. KOFFLER & A. REPPY, supra note 75, at 34-35; R. POUND,supra note 75,
at 131, 133.
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and trespass on the case.78 Although the former was of more ancient
origin and imposed comparatively stricter liability,7 9 both writs closely
conformed to the process constraints.8 0
The liability rules governing intentional wrongs, which evolved
from the earlier writs of trespass,"' illustrate the manner in which rules
of substance traditionally have accommodated the necessary constraints
of process. The elements of the plaintiff's prima facie case in battery-
intent, contact, and causation-present essentially "what happened?" is-
sues that lend themselves to resolution through adjudication.8 2 The ele-
ment of intent threatened to pose nonverifiable issues of fact,8 3 but
intent, along with the element of consent, avoided process difficulties by
relying on an objective rather than a subjective standard.8 4 The "rea-
sonableness" issues that presented some of the affirmative defenses to
intentional torts, which are more open-ended and hence more likely to
present process difficulties, have been recognized only recently and re-
flect the lowered sensitivity toward process concerns that is characteris-
tic of the modern, negligence-dominated tort era.85
78 See generally J. KOFFLER & A. REPPY, supra note 75, at 152-53, 174; 3 T. STREET,
FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL LIABILITY 223 (1906).
79 Seegenerally J. KOFFLER & A. REPPY, supra note 75, at 175; Peck, Negligence and Liabiliy
Without Fault in Tort Law, in DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE
AND COMPENSATION STUDY 51-55 (1970).
80 The writs were specific and were confined to statements of what actually happened.
For examples, see C. CLARK & H. STEPHEN, supra note 60, at 48-50; J. KOFFLER & A. REPPY,
supra note 59, at 154-55, 182.
81 A list of the actions encompassed by trespass vi el annis ("with force and arms") in-
cludes menaces, assault, battery, mayhem, false imprisonment, and rape. See generaly H.
FINCH, A SUMMARY OF THE COMMON LAw OF ENGLAND, Table 14 (1654). These writs
correspond to currently-re-ognized intentional torts.
82 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 13 (1965).
83 Certainly, if intent were equated with a subjective desire that a result be achieved by
one's conduct, problems of proof would arise frequently. In many cases it is clear from an
actor's behavior what he desires to accomplish. In a significant number of cases, however,
behavior is sufficiently ambiguous to prevent inferences regarding the actor's subjective
desires.
84 "Intent" thus is equated not only with results subjectively desired, but also with re-
suits believed with substantial certainty to follow from his actions. See, e.g., Garratt v. Dailey,
46 Wash. 2d 197, 279 P.2d 1091 (1955); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A (1965).
Although "believe" connotes a measure of subjectivity, this extension of the concept of intent
encourages a more objective approach. See also infra notes 204, 205 and accompanying text.
On the element of consent, see supra note 55 and accompanying text. It should be observed
that intent raises nonverifiability problems only at the adjudicative level, because actors can
determine their own intent; in contrast, consent raises problems at both the adjudicative and
the primary behavior levels, because actors frequently cannot determine the states of mind of
others.
85 The necessity defense to trespass actions, with its focus on the reasonableness of the
defendant's actions, is a good example. See W. PROSSER, supra note 16, at 124-26. A recent
English case, in which a London borough sued squatters who sought shelter in unoccupied
public buildings during London's housing shortage, reveals the problems one can expect to
encounter. The defendants raised the necessity defense. In denying its application, the Lord
Justice focused on the process problems that the court would face in determining which de-
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
By far the most significant tort law development from a process
perspective has been the rise to dominance of the negligence concept
over the last 150 years. With its heavy reliance on the vague principle of
"reasonableness under all the circumstances," the negligence concept
was destined to cause difficulties. The effects of negligence rules on pri-
mary behavior suggest that even superficially vague rules can guide be-
havior effectively if they invoke widely understood and recognized
moral principles. To the extent that the negligence system's admonition
to avoid creating unreasonable risks has served to guide primary con-
duct, it can be attributed to the success with which it captures the time-
honored maxim that one should consider the interests of others when
one acts.
8 6
A troublesome question that the courts addressed early was
whether negligence should be judged on the basis of an objective or sub-
jective test. If an objective test were used, it would violate the conform-
ability constraint because it would ask more of mentally incompetent
persons than they could deliver.8 7 But if a subjective test were used, it
would present nonverifiable questions of whether particular individuals
had done the best that reasonably could be expected of them.88 More-
over, a subjective standard might ambiguously convey the mistaken im-
pression that actors are free to impose on others not only their mental
limitations but also their values.8 9 On balance, this article's analysis
supports the decision to rely on an objective standard.90 The negative
fendants were entitled to occupancy. See London Borough of Southwark v. Williams, 2 All
E.R. 175 (C.A. 1971) (opinion of Megaw, L.J.). Seegenerally Henderson, supra note 5, at 495-
500.
86 See general'y Englard, The System Builders: A Critical Appraisal of Modern American Tort
Theory, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 27, 65 (1980); Schwartz, The Vitality of Aegligence and the Ethics of
Strict Liability, 15 GA. L. REv. 963 (1981).
87 Professor Rodgers is critical of the tendency to apply objective standards to what he
calls nonrational behavior: "What has happened is that a social conception of negligence,
understandably evolving in the context of rational decisionmaking, came to be applied indis-
criminately to nonrational actors who were held to standards they could not meet." Rodgers,
supra note 13, at 18.
88 See, e.g., Vaughan v. Menlove, 3 Bing. (N.C.) 468, 474-75, 132 Eng. Rep. 490, 493
(C.P. 1837) (opinion of Tindal, C.J.) ("It is contended. . . that the question ought to have
been whether the Defendant had acted honestly and bona fide to the best of his own judg-
ment. That, however, would leave so vague a line as to afford no rule at all, the degree of
judgment belonging to each individual being infinitely various .... "). See generall W.
PROSSER, supra note 16, at 152-54.
89 The problem stems from the inherent difficulties in attempting to separate psycholog-
ical predispositions that are value-neutral-forgetfulness and incomprehension, for exam-
pie-from those that are not-for example, indifference to the interests of others. See also infra
notes 155, 205 and accompanying text.
90 See, e.g., Brown v. Kendall, 60 Mass. 292 (1850); Vaughan v. Menlove, 3 Bing. (N.C.)
468, 132 Eng. Rep. 490 (C.P. 1837); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283B(b)(1), (2)
(1965). See generally Seavey, Negligence--Subjective or Objective?, 41 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1927).
Regarding the standard of care required of children, the courts have adopted a somewhat
more subjective test. Juries have sometimes been instructed to take into account not only a
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effects of asking more than subnormal individuals can deliver are miti-
gated to the extent that they can choose to avoid particularly risky activ-
ities.91 A subjective approach would almost certainly have been
unworkable as a guide to either primary or adjudicative behavior.
Another source of process difficulties has been the tendency for neg-
ligence cases to present "what would have happened if. . . ?" questions
in connection with the issues of causation and damages.92 Given the
generally recognized objectives of tort law, these hypothetical questions
cannot be avoided altogether. But they do threaten plaintiffs with in-
herently intractable problems of proof. Courts have largely avoided
these problems in connection with the issue of causation by allowing
plaintiffs to rely on unsupported assertions of common sense expectation
rather than proof. In so doing, they tacitly shift to the defendant the
burden of coming forward with evidence that the plaintiff would have
been injured anyway.93 Of course, proximate causation remains part of
the plaintiff's prima facie case.94 As a practical matter, however, that
issue is one that the defendant raises in the relatively few cases in which
it is presented. If courts insisted that the plaintiff prove that his harm
would have been avoided had the defendant exercised due care, the
proximate cause issue would present substantial process difficulties.95
child's age, but also his experience and intelligence. Seegenerall
, 
W. PROSSER, supra note 16,
at 155; Shulman, The Standard of Care Required of Children, 37 YALE L.J. 618 (1928). To the
extent that children are held to the standard of a reasonably prudent child of similar age, the
judge and jury presumably have had sufficient contact with children of different ages to for-
mulate an objective standard. However, to the extent that courts have instructed juries to
account for an individual child's intelligence or experience, more difficult process problems
may be raised.
91 Mentally incompetent persons thus can plan their activities or have their activities
planned for them so as to avoid being in control of dangerous instrumentalities such as motor
vehicles and other heavy equipment.
92 For analyses of the use of hypothetical questions in connection with the causation
issue, see generally Henderson, A Defense of the Use of the Hypothetical Case to Resolve the Causation
Issue-The NeedforAn Expanded, Rather Than A Contracted, Analsis, 47 Tx. L. REv. 183 (1969);
Thode, The Indefensible Use of the Hypothetical Case to Determine Cause in Fact, 46 TEx. L. REV.
423 (1968); Thode, A Reply to the Defense of the Use of the Hypothetical Case to Resolve the Causation
Issue, 47 TEx. L. REV. 1344 (1969). Although I defended the use of "what would have hap-
pened if?" questions, I did so on grounds that are compatible with the present analysis. See
in/ta notes 93-96 and accompanying text. For an analysis of the use of hypothetical questions
in connection with the damages issues, see generally Leubsdorf, supra note 59.
93 See generally Henderson, supra note 92, at 197. The talk of "tacitly shifting the burden"
admittedly is mine; yet Prosser agrees with my statement that courts allow plaintiffs'to rely on
common sense assertions rather than on proof. See W. PROSSER, supra note 16, at 24243
nn.50-53.
94 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328A(c) (1965).
95 In some cases, it would be clear whether the plaintiff would or would not have been
injured. But in many cases it would not be clear, and the plaintiff would be hard pressed to
"prove" something that never happened. More often than not, the best that the plaintiff
would be able to offer would be an expert's statistical proof. Given the inherent difficulties of
proof in these cases, courts tend to be lenient with plaintiffs. See, e.g., Hamil v. Bashline, 481
Pa. 256, 392 A.2d 1280 (1978).
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By tacitly shifting to the defendant the burden of coming forward in
most cases, however, these difficulties have been largely avoided. 96
Even if it is assumed that an objective negligence standard avoids
difficulties with the first three process constraints, it is more doubtful
that it does so with respect to the fourth, the manageability constraint.
As in the earlier-discussed hypothetical case involving judicial review of
the reasonableness of the municipal budget for police protection, the
question of whether a person has acted reasonably frequently presents
complex, polycentric issues. 97 Even if it is assumed that actors intui-
tively can reach sensible planning decisions ex ante while exercising
managerial discretion, it is unclear whether principles of reasonableness
will support judicial review and evaluation of those decisions ex post.
Given the inherent limitations on negligence as a guide to adjudicative
behavior, one might have expected that by now the process difficulties
associated with such a vague standard as "reasonableness under the cir-
cumstances" would have caused its replacement by some more manage-
able combination of strict liabilities and strict immunities.98
That negligence has survived to this point can be attributed to a
combination of factors, not the least of which is its attractivenes from a
substantive policy perspective. The two most important factors from a
process perspective are reliance on a hypothetical "reasonable person"
to cover basic situations involving the general reasonableness stan-
dard,99 and the development of specific rules to cover special situa-
tions. 10° Reliance on the reasonable person supports an empathetic
approach in which the tribunal places itself hypothetically in the posi-
tion of the defendant and recreates the largely intuitive process of exer-
96 They are avoided at least in the sense that in most cases the plaintiff reaches the trier
of fact when he proves that the defendant's negligent conduct in fact caused him to suffer
injury. If the defendant does not raise the proximate cause issue, it disappears from the case
as a practical matter. And in the relatively rare case in which the defendant succeeds in
presenting a strong proximate cause argument, either proof on that is available or the plain-
tiff's rhetorical assertions are weak. The tacit shifting to the defendant of the burden of going
forward thus assures that proximate cause will become an issue only in those cases in which
the verifiability problems are not great. Process problems associated with the damages issues
are reduced by reliance on standardized measurements such as life-expectancy 'tables. But
difficulties remain. See generaly Leubsdorf, supra note 59.
97 See supra text accompanying notes 34-41.
98 Strict liability and immunity rules do not present complex, polycentric planning
problems so long as the activities to which the liabilities and immunities attach are defined
specifically. See supra note 44 and accompanying text. To some extent, of course, the expecta-
tion alluded to in the text has been fulfilled. Strict products liability is a rapidly expanding
field of tort law. No-fault and worker compensation systems also have been fairly widely
implemented. But the fact remains that a significant portion of the traditional negligence
system is not only intact, but expanding. See general Henderson, srpra note 5; Schwartz,
supra note 86.
99 See generally James, The Qualities of the Reasonable Man in Negligence Cases, 16 Mo. L.
REv. 1 (1951).
tO0 See, e.g., infra notes 106-12 and accompanying text.
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cising managerial discretion. 01 Litigants advance arguments which,
although explicitly couched in terms of what a reasonable person would
have done, implicitly invite the tribunal to empathize with them. 102
This approach does not reduce the polycentricity in these cases, but
rather provides a way for decisionmakers to cope. To this extent, it rep-
resents a tacit departure from the adjudicative mode. But litigants can
participate meaningfully when the tribunal is called upon to review in-
dividual conduct not involving complex or sophisticated technology. 10 3
It is more difficult for judges and juries to empathize with institutional
actors. 10 4 Because many of the earlier cases decided under the general
negligence standard involved conduct with which tribunals could em-
pathize, reliance on the reasonable person helped them to cope with
polycentric issues in negligence cases. 10 5
The second type of judicial response to the potential process diffi-
culties in negligence cases has been the development of rules of decision
that reduce the polycentricity in particularly troublesome areas. An ex-
ample of such an adjustment occurred in cases involving negligence
claims against physicians. For the courts to review independently the
reasonableness of standardized medical procedures clearly would exceed
101 An early Michigan decision recognized the empathetic approach: "Thus the problem
. . . is only to be satisfactorily solved by the jury placing themselves in the position of the
injured person, and examining those circumstances as they then presented themselves to him,
and from that stand-point judging whether he was guilty of negligence or not." Detroit &
Milwaukee R.R. v. Van Steinburg, 17 Mich. 99, 119 (1868).
102 Because of the risks of inducing bias and prejudice through direct appeals by lawyers
to jurors to identify with their clients, courts have placed restrictions on the directness with
which these calls for empathy may be made. Thus, courts have held "put yourself in my
client's place" arguments improper and grounds for reversible error, particularly when the
damages issue is involved. See, e.g., Fisher v. Williams, 327 S.W.2d 257, 264 (Mo. 1959);
Annot., 70 A.L.R.2d 935 (1960).
103 This is the important element that distinguishes much of traditional negligence litiga-
tion from the new forms of public law adjudication. In neither context are the rules of deci-
sion sufficiently specific to support claims logically derived from them. But when the parties
in a negligence case present their arguments to a jury comprised of a cross-section of the
community who are able to appreciate the implications of what occurred and whose instincts
can be trusted, they are able to participate meaningfully by invoking the shared expectations
of the community. In the piblic law litigation described earlier, however, this type of partici-
pation is less possible. Instead, the large number of interested parties typically participate in
an unruly process of negotiation ruled over by a combination judge/manager/power broker.
See authorities cited supra note 23.
104 When a finder of fact is asked to assess the reasonableness of a complicated product
design, for example, it is more difficult for him to put himself in the appropriate corporate
shoes and answer the question "how would I have acted if I had been General Motors?" I do
not have empirical proof to support this assertion, but I submit that it is intuitively correct.
105 See, .g., Brown v. Kendall, 60 Mass. 292 (1850), in which the plaintiff sought to re-
cover for injuries sustained when the defendant inadvertently struck him in the face with a
stick while trying to separate fighting dogs. Admittedly, a significant percentage of negli-
gence cases since the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries have involved industrial
defendants, especially railroads. Seegeneral I F. HILLIARD, THE LAW OF ToRTs 339 (3d ed.
1866). However, in many of those cases more specific extrajudicial standards were available
with which to reduce or eliminate the need to rely on the general reasonableness standard.
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the limits of adjudication. 0 6 The judicial response in medical malprac-
tice cases has been to limit inquiry to the more manageable question of
whether the conduct of the individual physician conformed to the estab-
lished standards of his profession.107 In effect, courts have delegated to
the medical profession responsibility for developing appropriate medical
procedures.
A more stark example of this "avoidance by delegation" technique
occurred in response to negligence actions brought by children against
their parents. Perceiving a need to adjust the duty of care to reflect the
special relationship between parents and their children 0 8 and reluctant
as a substantive matter to impose objective "off the rack" standards of
parental obligation, 10 9 courts would have faced significant problems of
verifiability and manageability in working out "tailor-made" duties ow-
ing from individual parents to their children. 10 It thus is consistent
with the present analysis that courts avoided these difficulties by grant-
ing parents immunity from negligence-based liability.1 '
Developments in recent years support this analysis. Many courts
now allow negligence actions by children against their parents, but only
106 Several commentators have recognized the process difficulties inherent in reviewing
the professional conduct of physicians. See McCoid, The Care Required of Medical Practitioners,
12 VAND. L. REv. 549,607-08 (1959); Morris, Custom and Negligence, 42 COLUM. L. RaV. 1147,
1164 (1942); Pearson, The Role of Custom in Medical Malpractice Cases, 51 IND. L.J. 528, 534-35
(1976).
107 See Loudon v. Scott, 58 Mont. 645, 654, 194 P. 488, 491 (1920); McCandless v.
McWha, 22 Pa. 261, 267-68 (1853). See genera4'y W. PROSSER, supra note 16, at 161-66; Mc-
Coid, supra note 106, at 558-59.
108 Courts and commentators have recognized the need to tread carefully in litigating
tort disputes between parent and child. The two most frequently cited concerns are the possi-
ble disruption of the family unit, and interference with parental discretion. See, e.g., Cannon
v. Cannon, 287 N.Y. 425, 40 N.E.2d 236 (1942); Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 79 P. 788
(1905). See generally McCurdy, Torts Between Persons in Domestic Relation, 43 HARV. L. REv.
1030, 1060, 1074-77 (1930). The long-recognized privilege of a parent to inflict disciplinary
punishment on a child reflects the law's willingness to adjust to the parent-child relationship.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 147-155 (1965).
109 Judicial reluctance to impose objective standards is clearly reflected in Holodook v.
Spencer, 36 N.Y.2d 35, 50, 324 N.E.2d 338, 346, 364 N.Y.S.2d 859, 871 (1974):
In the family relation between parent and child,. . . we do not believe that
application of this standardized norm is the wisest course.. . . Each child is
different, as is each parent. . . . [T]here are so many combinations and per-
mutations of parent-child relationships that may result that the search for a
standard would necessarily be in vain--and properly so.
See also Schneider v. Coe, 405 A.2d 682 (Del. 1979); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 895G, Comment k (1965). But see Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d 914, 921, 479 P.2d 648, 653,
92 Cal. Rptr. 288, 293 (1971) (applying a "reasonable and prudent parent" standard).
110 Adoption of a subjective approach in parent-child cases presents problems of nonver-
ifiability. In addition, the question "what should this parent have done to best look after the
interests of this child, under these circumstances?" is polycentric.
111 This immunity originated at common law with the landmark case of Hewlett v.
George, 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891). See also Reingold v. Reingold, 115 N.J.L. 532, 181 A.
153 (1935); Sorrentino v. Sorrentino, 248 N.Y. 626, 162 N.E. 551 (1928). See Holodook v.
Spencer, 36 N.Y.2d 35, 50, 324 N.E.2d 338, 346, 364 N.Y.S.2d 859, 871 (1974).
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in connection with activities (such as the operation of motor vehicles)
that are not unique to the parent-child relationship and therefore do not
require courts to address the difficult question of what a reasonable par-
ent with the attitudes and values of the individual defendant would
have maintained in the way of levels of care toward his children. 12
I have examined two common law techniques for reducing the pro-
cess difficulties of negligence cases, both of which involve delegating re-
sponsibility to nonadjudicative decisionmakers. A third technique, not
involving such delegation, remains: the development of matrices of
rules and subrules defining the duties owed between and among various
special categories of actors. The common law rules governing the liabili-
ties of possessors of land epitomize this technique. In essence, the courts
developed relatively specific exceptions to the general duty of care,"13
together with exceptions to these exceptions.114 These rules would not
have been necessary, or at least necessary to the same degree, if courts
had been willing as a substantive matter to treat landowners' responsi-
bilities to various categories of entrants the same as the duty of care
generally owed in the society. Courts felt, however, that the responsibil-
ities owed by landowners should vary depending on the status of the
entrants, and so the need for specific rules arose. Instead of delegating
to landowners the responsibility for defining their own duties to others,
courts undertook to define these duties by exercising their rule making
function.
Interestingly, in recent years some courts have discarded the com-
mon law rules governing possessors' liability to entrants, relying instead
on the general negligence standard. 1 5 This move has been motivated in
part by substantive considerations, but courts also have cited the in-
creasing complexity of the traditional rules that they insist has led to
112 See, e.g., Schenk v. Schenk, 100 Ill. App. 2d 199, 241 N.E.2d 12 (1968); Balts v. Baits,
273 Minn. 419, 142 N.W.2d 66 (1966); Goller v. White, 20 Wis.2d 402, 122 N.W.2d 193
(1963).
113 Entrants on land are separated into three distinct classes. The business invitee, whose
presence benefits the owner, is owed the general standard of reasonable care. See generaly
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 332, 341A, 343, 343A, 343B, 344 (1965); W. PROS-
SER, supra note 16, at 385-98. The licensee, whose presence is merely permitted and is of no
benefit to the owner, is entitled only to be warned of known dangers. See generaf RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 341, 342, 330 (1965); W. PROSSER, supra note 16, at 376-85.
The trespassing adult, who enters another's land without permission, generally is only pro-
tected from intentional injury. Seegenerally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 329, 333,
342 (1965); W. PROSSER, supra note 16, at 357-64.
114 The most common exceptions to these exceptions are for child trespassers, see RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 339 (1965), discovered trespassers, see RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 336-338 (1965), and trespassers consistently using a limited area, such
as a footpath, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 334, 335 (1965).
115 -See Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968). See
generalo' Hawkins, Premises Liabliy After Repudiation of the Status Categories: Allocation ofJudge and
Jug, Functions, 1981 UTAH. L. REV. 15.
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"confusion and conflict."' 16 These decisions, of course, may have substi-
tuted one source of process difficulty for another-if the status of a par-
ticular entrant continues to be a relevant (even if not controlling)
consideration, reliance on a vague reasonableness standard will lead to
increased levels of polycentricity.
In describing the extent to which the content of tort law has been
influenced by the process constraints, I must be careful not to overstate
the force of my thesis. Substantive considerations obviously have played
a dominant role in shaping the common law of torts. An important
reason for allowing the medical profession to set its own standards is
that courts can assume that these standards are adequate to protect the
interests of patients;" l7 courts have granted parents immunity from neg-
ligence-based liability in large part because courts can assume that par-
ents will, as a general rule, act in the best interests of their children;" 8
and landowners owe little in the way of duties to trespassers because it is
believed to be neither fair nor efficient to require them to invest re-
sources to protect unforeseeable wrongdoers.' 19 The foregoing analysis,
however, strongly suggests that behind the substantive logic is a process
logic that also helps to shape the contours of tort doctrine.
Although the examples of common law tort doctrine considered
thus far have avoided process difficulties by cutting back on actors' po-
tential tort liability, process difficulties also can be reduced by ex-
panding liability. An example of such a development was the
enactment of worker compensation statutes in most states early in this
century.'20 Although a commonly accepted explanation for the adop-
tion of worker compensation systems suggests that they were the product
of substantive policy choices,121 a more accurate view recognizes the sig-
116 Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 116, 443 P.2d 561, 566, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 102
(1968) (quoting Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale, 358 U.S. 625, 630-31 (1959)). See generaly
Green, The Duty Problem in Negligence Cases: II, 29 COLUM. L. REv. 255, 272 (1929).
117 See generally McCoid, supra note 106, at 688.
118 See, e.g., Lander v. Seaver, 32 Vt. 114, 122 (1859) ("This parental power is little liable
to abuse, for it is continually restrained by natural affection ... "); see also McCurdy, supra
note 108, at 1076.
119 See generaly W. PROSSER, supra note 16, at 357-58. Of course when the trespass is
foreseeable, both fairness and efficiency concerns support the imposition of duties. See excep-
tions discussed supra note 114.
120 Seegenerally I A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION §§ 4.00-5.30, at
23-40 (1964 & Supp. 1982).
121 For an example of the substantive rhetoric that preceded enactment, see the opinion
of Chief Justice Winslow in Driscoll v. Allis-Chalmers Co., 144 Wis. 451, 469, 129 N.W. 401,
408-09 (1911):
When [the laborer] has yielded up life, or limb, or health in the service of that
marvelous industrialism which is our boast, shall not the great public. . . be
charged with the duty of securing from want the laborer himself, if he survive,
as well as his helpless and dependent ones? .. .
These are burning and difficult questions. . .[that] are well within the
province of the legislative arm of the government.
[Vol. 67:901
]TORT PROCESS
nificant role played by process considerations.1 22
Popular impressions notwithstanding, worker compensation stat-
utes were not so much a reflection of dissatisfaction at the substantive
level with perceived inadequacies in the benefits available in tort to in-
jured workers as they were the product of dissatisfaction at the process
level with the unworkability of the common law system. Until the mid-
dle of the nineteenth century, employers generally enjoyed immunity
from tort liability for workplace injuries. 123 As long as this immunity
persisted, process problems in workplace-injury cases were by and large
avoided. As pressures for change mounted and found expression in
court-made exceptions to the traditional immunity rules, the rules of
decision became so complex as to render the process difficulties intolera-
ble.124 At the substantive level, by the time the worker compensation
statutes were enacted, workers were well on their way to victory. The
statutes were aimed primarily at eliminating the process problems left in
the wake of judicially-implemented substantive reforms. 125 With their
enactment, the circle was complete. A workable (from a process per-
spective) strict-immunity rule had been replaced with a negligence sys-
tem that proved unworkable; therefore, the negligence system itself was
replaced with a more workable statutory system of strict liability. 126
Viewed subtantively, the movement from strict immunity to strict liabil-
ity is a dramatic expansion of workers' rights; viewed from the process
perspective, the tort system has returned full circle to its point of origin.
Another example of this cyclical pattern is the development of priv-
ity-free strict liability for defectively manufactured products. At the be-
ginning of this century, the general rule was one of strict manufacturers'
immunity from negligence-based liability to injured consumers.' 27 This
122 I am indebted to Professors Friedman and Ladinsky for their sociological analysis of
the implementation of worker compensation statutes in this country. Much of the analysis
that follows is based on their work. See Friedman & Ladinsky, Social Change and the Law of
Industrialccident, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 50 (1967).
123 See id at 54-59.
124 Seegenerally id at 59-69 (discussing both policy and process considerations that led to
pressures for change).
125 The point is not that injured workers were necessarily recovering inadequately in tort
actions, but rather that the piecemeal judicial reforms escalated the administrative costs so
dramatically that it came to be in everyone's interest (except perhaps that of trial lawyers) to
replace the common law with a legislated compensation system. See id at 65-69.
126 "Workable" undoubtedly overstates the case supporting adoption of the workmen's
compensation statutes. For criticism of worker compensation systems, see generall5 H. SOMERS
& A. SOMERS, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 268-89 (1954); Brodie, The Adequacy of Workmen r
Compensation as Social Insurance: A Review of Developments and Proposals, 1963 Wis. L. REV. 57,
63-91. Professors Friedman and Ladinsky suggest that worker compensation law may be de-
veloping in the same "stability-instability-replacement" cycle as did the earlier fellow-servant
immunity rule. See Friedman & Ladinsky, supra note 122, at 81.
127 See W. PROSSER, supra note 16, at 641-42. The decision generally recogized as the
source of this immunity is Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 M. & W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex.
1842).
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general rule gradually became subject to a number of exceptions. 28
Once the immunity rule fell 129 and courts began to decide "how much
quality control is reasonable?" on a case-by-case basis, it was inevitable
that the combined pressures of substance and process would lead to the
adoption of strict liability.1 30 As in the case of worker compensation
laws, the adoption of strict manufacturers' liability traditionally is
viewed as a triumph of substantive policy concerns favoring injured con-
sumers.13 1 From the process perspective, however, it is also seen as a
necessary and largely inevitable return to a rule of decision that avoids,
as had the earlier rule of strict manufacturers' immunity, the types of
process difficulties described in this article.
III
THE CLEAREST EXAMPLE OF THE PROCESS CONSTRAINTS
AT WORK: THE NO-GENERAL-DUTY-TO-RESCUE
RULE
From any view, the absence at common law of a general duty to
rescue' 32 is of small practical consequence. The many exceptions to the
general rule have all but consumed it.3 More important, one comfort-
ably can assume that even without a legal duty most persons will help
others in distress whenever they can do so at little cost to themselves. 134
And yet, perhaps because it strikes most persons as counterintuitive, the
general rule of no-duty-to-rescue always has been a favorite with tort
commentators, providing a window through which a succession of writ-
ers have peered into the substantive foundations of our tort law
system. 135
128 The exceptions to the "privity rule" began with Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N.Y. 397
(1852). They are reviewed and analyzed in then-Judge Cardozo's opinion in MacPherson v.
Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
129 See MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
130 See generaly Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L.
REv. 791 (1966); Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE
LJ. 1099 (1960).
131 See, e.g., Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 462, 150 P.2d 436, 441
(1944) (Traynor, J., concurring); Kessler, Products Liability, 76 YALE LJ. 887, 925 (1967); Pros-
ser, The Fall of the Citadel, supra note 130, at 799-800.
132 See, e.g., Buch v. Amory Mfg. Co., 69 N.H. 257, 44 A. 809 (1898); Yania v. Bigan, 397
Pa. 316, 155 A.2d 343 (1959). See general.5 W. PROSSER, supra note 16, at 338-48. As the
phrase is used here and elsewhere in the literature, a "general duty to rescue" would be a duty
imposed by law in the absence of any preexisting relationship or causal connection between
parties.
133 See infra notes 186, 191-92 and accompanying text.
134 If "cost to themselves" includes psychological costs, this appears definitional. Most
people perceive that they derive benefits from helping others; if the corresponding costs are
low, they will presumably engage in rescue.
135 See, e.g., Ames, Law and Morals, 22 HARV. L. REv. 97, 111-13 (1908); Bohlen, The
Moral Duty to Aid Others As a Basis of Tort Liability, 56 U. PA. L. REv. 217 (1908); Gregory, The
Good Samaritan & The Bad- The Anglo-American Law, in THE GOOD SAMARITAN & THE LAW 23
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Defenders of the general rule have been comparatively few and
largely unconvincing. In an early essay, Ames used this no-duty rule to
emphasize the distinction between law and morals, t36 but he did not
explain why the legal and moral positions should differ so sharply.137
Contemporary writers have added relatively little to our understanding
of why the no-duty rule persists. Professor Epstein has argued that, ab-
sent some cause-in-fact connection between the defendant's conduct and
the plaintiff's plight, there is no moral basis on which to premise a legal
duty to act.138 But his view that the basis of all duties in tort law is the
cause-in-fact connection between the actor's conduct and the victim's
harm has yet to convince many other tort commentators.13 9
Writers who view tort law as a means of enhancing allocative effi-
ciency also confront difficulties in rationalizing the no-duty-to-rescue
rule. Whenever one person, at relatively small cost, can act to prevent a
significantly greater loss to another, efficiency will be enhanced if the
would-be rescuer is induced to act.140 Attempting to defend the no-duty
rule, Professors Landes and Posner argue that it may help to avoid dis-
couraging the wealth-maximizing efforts of those who would be likely to
rescue others voluntarily in the absence of a liability rule.14t But the
most helpful conclusion they are able to reach is that the rule may not
be quite so inefficient as it seems.142
Given these difficulties in explaining the no-duty-to-rescue rule, it is
not surprising that numerous commentators have urged that it be over-
(J. Ratcliffe ed. 1966); Landes &Posner, Salvors, Finders, Good Samaritans, and Other Rescuers: An
Economic StudP, of Law andAltruism, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 83 (1978); Weinrib, The Carefor a Duty to
Rescue, 90 YALE L.J. 247 (1980).
136 See Ames, supra note 135.
137 Ames, along with Holmes and others, embraced the view that the law was a science
capable of being understood from a relatively limited set of legal principles by applying scien-
tific legal reasoning. See generally G. WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERIcA: AN INTELLECTUAL
HISTORY 26-29 (1980). Thus, although Ames suggested that legal rules were evolving toward
notions of morality, he makes little attempt to explain the original divergence other than to
suggest that an early belief that the law could never discern the true thought or intent of a
man led to "formal and immoral" punitive law. See Ames, supra note 135, at 97.
138 See Epstein, supra note 2, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. at 200-01.
139 For criticism of Epstein's analysis, see Englard, supra note 86, at 57-63; Posner, Strict
Liability: A Comment, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 205 (1973).
140 If both rescuer and rescuee were free to bargain their way out of the situation (as they
are not, given the exigencies of the circumstances) they would find it mutually advantageous
to arrange to spend some resources in order to save substantially more. Such a move would
be "Pareto superior," because at least one of the parties would be made better off without
making the other worse off. See Coleman, Eftiency, Utility and Wealth Maximization, 8 HoF-
STRA L. REV. 509, 512-13 (1980). When tort law imposes a duty to rescue, the rescuer may be
required to expend his own resources to save the resources of the rescuee. Even if the rescuer
is not reimbursed, the move will be "Kaldor Hicks superior" as long as the rescuee saves more
than the rescuer expends. See generaly id at 513-14.
141 See Landes & Posner, supra note 135, at 121-24.
142 Id at 124, 126.
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turned.43 One such argument has been advanced only recently.
Stressing fairness reasons, Professor Weinrib has argued that courts
should recognize a general "easy-rescue" rule. 144 He would impose lia-
bility whenever an actor who refused to assist another in an emergency
could have prevented, at small cost to himself, greater loss to the
other.1 45 Weinrib recognizes the administrative difficulties of a general
duty to rescue 4 6 and affirmatively answers the question of "whether the
indeterminacy in a rescue principle will be legally manageable."' 147 Al-
though he recognizes the general relevance of administrative concerns,
Weinrib does not address adequately the range of process problems
raised; his easy-rescue rule would not be nearly so manageable as he
makes it out to be.
The analysis that follows will test the proposed easy rescue rule
against the process constraints developed earlier. The question to be
answered is this: Would a general duty to engage in a relatively low cost
rescue violate the process constraints? As the following analysis makes
clear, the imposition of such a duty would, in varying degrees, violate
them all.
Whether a general duty to undertake easy rescue would present sig-
nificant problems of incomprehensibility would depend on whether a
subjective or an objective test were used-that is, on whether courts did
or did not purport to take into account an individual defendant's psy-
chological predisposition in imposing a duty to act. As will be explained
shortly, a subjective test is more likely than an objective test to be mis-
understood by those to whom it is directed. The traditional negligence
standard avoids problems in this regard by employing an objective
test. 148 A general duty to rescue presumably could accomplish the same
goal by adopting a similarly objective test: "Would a reasonable, psy-
chologically normal person in the defendant's position have been able to
effect a rescye at relatively little cost?" A subjective test, by contrast,
would excus' a defendant who could show that he was psychologically
incapable of responding to the plaintiff's need for help.
A major problem with an objective test in the rescue context is that
fairness-based arguments favoring a subjective approach are much
stronger here than in the general negligence context. This point will be
143 See, e.g., M. SHAPO, THE DUTY TO ACT: TORT LAW, POWER & PUBLIC POLICY xii,
64-73 (1977); Ames, supra note 135, at 112-13; Franklin, Vermont Requires Rescue: A Comment, 25
STAu'. L. REv. 51 (1972); Rudolph, The Duty to Act: A Proposed Rule, 44 NEB. L. REV. 499,509
(1965); Weinrib, supra note 135.
144 See Weinrib, supra note 135.
145 The author circumscribes his duty with two limits: there must be an "emergency,"
and the rescue must not "inconvenience" the rescuer. See Weinrib, supra note 135, at 285.
146 Id
147 Id at 275.
148 See supra notes 82-85 and accompanying text.
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developed in connection with the conformability constraint, but its es-
sence is not difficult to grasp. In both the negligence and the rescue
contexts, whenever the defendant is psychologically incapable of acting
reasonably, the tort claim is brought by one innocent person against
another innocent person. But in the negligence context, the defendant
has caused the plaintiffs harm. Between two innocent parties it is argua-
ble on fairness grounds that the person who caused the harm should
bear the loss.149 In the rescue context, in contrast, the defendant who is
psychologically incapable of acting reasonably is not only innocent of
wrong4 oing, but also is not responsible for causing the plaintiff's
harm.'50 In the rescue context no moral basis exists for shifting the loss
of an innocent plaintiff to an equally innocent defendant who is psycho-
logically incapable of acting to prevent the loss. 51
Professor Weinrib never explicitly addresses the issue of whether an
objective or a subjective test should be used in connection with his easy
rescue rule. At one point he refers to measuring the inconvenience to
the defendant "objectively in terms of market values."' 52 But it is clear
that he is thinking only in terms of objectively evaluating the "time and
effort directed at aiding the victim,"' 5 3 elements that I agree should be
objectively measured regardless of whether the defendant's psychologi-
cal predispositions are taken into account. On balance, Weinrib would
probably adopt what is here described as a subjective test, allowing the
defendant's psychological predispositions to be taken into account. Be-
cause his reasons for imposing a duty to rescue are fairness reasons, his
concept of "inconvenience" to the defendant is consistent with a subjec-
149 Many of the commentators who have supported an objective negligence standard
have taken this position. See, e.g., Edgerton, Negligence, Inadvertence, and Indiference; the Relation
of Mental States to Negligence, 39 HARv. L. REV. 849, 867-68 (1926). More recently, Professor
Epstein has advanced the thesis that the defendant's causing the plaintiff to suffer harm is
sufficient by itself to require the defendant to offer a good reason why he should not be liable
to the plaintiff. Epstein also argues that in the absence of a cause-in-fact connection, the
defendant owes no duty to the plaintiff. See generally Epstein, sup'a note 2, 3 J. LEGAL STUD.
165; Epstein, supra note 2, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151.
150 We are considering here the absence of a general duty to rescue; thus it is assumed
that no cause-in-fact connection exists between the defendant's conduct and the plaintiff's
predicament. See supra note 132. Although I do not agree with Professor Epstein's general
thesis that the absence of a causal connection prevents the would-be rescuer from owing any
duty to the would-be rescuee, I agree that in the special case being considered here-a would-
be rescuer who was psychologically incapable of rescue-the combination of an absence of
personal culpability and a lack of actual causation argue strongly for no liability.
151 Viewed in this way, the special case here being considered comes down to this: P, an
unlucky victim of circumstance, found himself in need of rescue; D, also an unlucky victim of
circumstance, witnessed P's plight. P and D were total strangers. Neither party was in any
way responsible for putting P in his predicament. D was psychologically incapable of helping
P. P suffered harm. Is there any moral reason why D should be obligated to make P whole?
I submit that there is not.
152 See Weinrib, supra note 135, at 275.
153 Id at 272.
.1982]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
tive approach.l s4 Insisting on an objective test would undermine the
moral basis on which he deems the duty to rest.
A subjective test, however, presents significant process problems.
From the standpoint of comprehensibility, a subjective test is likely to be
misunderstood at both the primary and adjudicative levels to condone
consideration of not only the actor's psychological predisposition but
also his values. In the familiar classroom hypothetical in which the de-
fendant could have saved a drowning child by wading ankle-deep into a
tranquil pond, it would not only be difficult but also arguably inappro-
priate to distinguish between the relevance of a deep-seated, pathologi-
cal aversion to pond water and the relevance of a deep-seated,
pathological aversion to children.' 55 Yet, adjusting for the latter type of
psychological predisposition would be tantamount to excusing the de-
fendant's failure to act on the ground that "he hates kids." That this
possibility is far from academic is indicated by the difficulties that courts
have encountered in struggling with analogous concepts in substantive
criminal law under the headings of "diminished responsibility" and "di-
minished capacity."' 156
Moreover, a general duty to undertake a relatively low cost rescue
would create problems in connection with the process constraint that
liability rules should avoid referring to nonverifiable factual events and
circumstances. In the adjudicative context, a subjective test based on
the individual defendant's psychological predispositions would present
plaintiffs with significant problems of proof.157 Moreover, regardless of
whether a subjective or an objective approach were used, imposition of a
general duty to rescue would present "what would have happened if
?" questions on a much more regular basis that in traditional negli-
gence cases.
Under traditional negligence rules, such questions arise primarily
154 Weinrib speaks of inconvenience in terms of "the pleasure that [the actor] must forego
in adhering to [the duty to rescue]." Id at 285. This is a seemingly subjective approach.
Weinrib appears to consider only the outrageous cases of nonrescue---cases in which defend-
ants refuse to help others out of malevolence and spite. Clearly, our "frozen with fear" hypo-
thetical cases are not of this variety.
155 The first defendant appears innocent of wrongdoing, assuming that he is telling the
truth. For a discussion of verifiability problems, see bifa note 157 and accompanying text.
The second defendant is more difficult to judge. At one extreme, he might come into court
and admit that he recognized the victim as his neighbor's child, for whom he has an abiding
dislike. Although he would be unlikely to admit to such motives, if he did they would consti-
tute an "outrageous" case. At the other extreme, the defendant's psychoanalyst might testify
that his patient's predisposition regarding children paralyzed him just as completely as the
first defendant's phobia regarding pond water. What, then, should be the result under a
subjective standard? For a discussion of an analogous problem in the criminal law context,
see also infa note 205.
156 See infra notes 204 & 205.
157 See supra notes 83, 84 and accompanying text.
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in connection with the issues of proximate causation and damages.158
Proximate causation is the more problematic of these two issues, but
even in this context such questions are relatively manageable. For a
general duty to rescue, however, process problems associated with such
questions would not be so easily avoided. The reason for this is the ab-
sence of an underlying cause-in-fact connection between the defendant's
behavior and the plaintiffs harm. In the context of traditional negli-
gence, the tacit assumption favoring the plaintiff in connection with the
issue of proximate cause is appropriate because the defendant's behavior
is not only unreasonable but also is the cause-in-fact of the plaintiff's
harm.159 In the general rescue context, the cause-in-fact connection is
missing; the only possible causal link between the defendant and the
plaintiff is proximate causation. It thus would be less appropriate in the
context of a general duty to rescue to supply the plaintiff with a pre-
sumption regarding the only issue of causation in the case. It follows
that hypothetical "what would have happened if?" questions would
arise more frequently in the rescue context than in the traditional negli-
gence context, and would present difficult problems of verification. 160
Even if nonverifiability in the adjudicative context were somehow
avoided, perhaps by relying on an objective test and a presumption of
proximate causation, a general duty to rescue would present problems of
nonverifiability at the level of primary behavior. These problems may
be seen clearly by comparing situations under traditional negligence
with those under the proposed general duty to rescue. Although an ac-
tor acting under traditional negligence principles may confront ambigu-
ity regarding the balance of risks and benefits flowing from his conduct,
at least he can assume that his putative victims would prefer that he
choose a course of conduct that is less likely to cause harm, and he usu-
ally can determine which course of action will produce this result.161 If
risk-averse actors in the negligence context err on the side of excessive
caution, their would-be victims will have no legitimate grounds for
complaint.162
158 See .3fira notes 92-96 and accompanying text.
159 The cause-in-fact connection, coupled with the defendant's negligent conduct, argua-
bly supplies sufficient grounds for liability in and of itself. See, e.g., In re Polemis & Furness,
Withy & Co., [1921] 3 KB. 560. In effect, by allowing defendants to raise the proximate
cause issue, the negligence system gives them "one last chance" to demonstrate why liability
would not further the objectives of the system.
160 In the earlier drowning-child hypothetical, for example, it might be difficult to deter-
mine whether the child was beyond saving before the defendant came along.
161 This is not to say that actors can easily determine which course of conduct is less
costly, but rather that they can usually determine which course is safer. Because accident
avoidance costs also are costs, the safer course may be the more costly approach.
162 Tort law is concerned with the unreasonable creation of risks rather than the unrea-
sonable elimination of risks. Even if it is recognized that from a social welfare standpoint
there is such a thing as "too much safety," see supa note 161, conduct that is too safe is
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In contrast, the ambiguities confronting would-be rescuers are not
so easily resolved in favor of safety. More frequently than in the tradi-
tional negligence context, would-be rescuers cannot determine whether
acting or refraining from acting is more likely to expose others to risks of
harm. Unlike the situation in the traditional negligence context, an ac-
tor responding to a general duty to rescue cannot assume that his would-
be rescuees would prefer to have him respond one way or the other. The
earlier hypothetical of the drowning child was easy, for the presence of a
child lying face down in the water calls for rescue most unambiguously.
But many cases are not this clear.' 63
Advocates of a general duty to rescue have tended to ignore these
problems of nonverifiability in their treatments of the subject. Professor
Weinrib, for example, addresses the "need for rescue" element with his
requirement that an emergency must exist before rescue is required."64
But he assumes, without discussion, that actors will know real emergen-
cies when they see them. His process concerns are limited to the man-
ageability of his easy-rescue rule as a guide to decision at trial; thus, he
focuses primarily on the ability of courts to draw lines of demarcation
after the fact. 165 Nowhere does he address the problems of ambiguity
and nonverifiability at the level of primary behavior. Weinrib's failure
to address these process problems undermines his argument that a gen-
generally not tortious. Our legal system tacitly relies on self-interest, rather than exposure to
liability, to guard against actors behaving too cautiously toward others.
163 For example, a potential rescuer observing a young man and woman struggling in the
back seat of an automobile may not be sure whether he is watching a rough-and-tumble
courtship or imminent rape. A call to the police will be either helpful or traumatic in its
effects, depending on the circumstances. Professor Gregory presents the following example of
the sorts of ambiguities facing potential rescuers:
Recently I read a letter to the editor in our local newspaper. It excoriated an
unnamed storekeeper for inexcusably accusing a small Negro child of in-
tending to shoplift and threatening him with jail. But the writer of the letter
really seemed to be flaying herself for not having lashed out at the store-
keeper. She felt that she should have alleviated the child's horrible embar-
rassment and the wound to his psyche. Indeed, she equated her failure with
the betrayal of Kitty Genovese by her neighbors. On the other hand, if she
had spoken up, she might have provoked even greater harm to the child.
Gregory, supra note 135, at 37 (footnote omitted).
To make matters worse, if the would-be rescuer guesses wrong, he may be liable in a
retaliatory tort action. See, e.g., Sloan v. Pierce, 74 Kan. 65, 85 P. 812 (1906) (defendant shot
plaintiff under the mistaken impression that such action was necessary to prevent plaintiff
from injuring defendant's father). See generaly W. PROSSER, sura note 16, at 113.
The rescuer runs the additional risk that he may conduct the rescue negligently. Al-
though this risk does not raise process concerns, it is related to the problem of a potential
rescuer's deciding, often under intense pressure of time, whether or not to intervene. The so-
called "Good Samaritan" statutes, enacted in a number of states, which relieve good faith
rescuers from liability for negligence, suggest that these concerns are shared generally. See,
e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-2891(a) (1972).
164 See Weinrib, supra note 135, at 285, 293.
165 See id at 276-77.
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eral duty of easy rescue is morally justified.1 66 I am fairly certain that he
would recognize nonverifiability in the adjudicative context as part of
the "administrative difficulties" of such a rule. But he fails to realize
that nonvirifiability also presents problems in the context of primary
behavior; therefore, he fails to perceive the full extent to which this con-
sideration detracts from the efficacy of a general duty to rescue.
Regarding the requirement that liability rules avoid calling for pat-
terns of behavior to which actors cannot conform, a general duty to res-
cue based on an objective reasonableness standard clearly would require
more than abnormally timid persons would be able to deliver.1 67 It
could be argued, of course, that the conformability constraint does not
prevent an objective standard from being imposed in the traditional
negligence context. 68 In the traditional negligence context, however,
actors possessing subnormal capacities are presumably able to avoid the
excessive burdens of the objective negligence standard by avoiding ac-
tivities that are especially risky to others and in which the actors' inca-
pacities are likely to contribute significantly to the risks. Given the
propensity of such persons *to cause harm to others, it does not seem
unfair to expect them to curtail their activities in this manner. 6 9
In contrast to the traditional negligence context, it not only would
be more difficult for psychologically handicapped persons to predict
those activities in which the need for them to engage in rescue might
arise, but it would also be unfair to expect them to restrict their activi-
ties so as to avoid the possibility of being called on to act. To some
extent, of course, it would be possible to predict those activities in which
someone is likely to be injured and to require assistance. 70 However,
under an objectively administered general duty to rescue, the abnor-
mally timid individual would be required to predict those occasions re-
quiring assistance from him. This would be a more difficult task,
requiring predictions of the likelihood not only of encountering persons
who need help, but also of the availability of other would-be rescuers. 17 '
166 Would Weinrib, for example, excuse a defendant in the "struggle-in-the-backseat"
hypothetical, seesupra note 163, who honestly and reasonably misinterprets the struggle to be
innocent courtship? If not, how does he answer the honest-but-mistaken defendant's argu-
ment that the law of torts unfairly puts him on the horns of a dilemma?
167 By "abnormally timid persons" I mean those whose psychological predispositions
render them less capable of acting to help others. See generally ALTRUISM AND HELPING BE-
HAVIOR: SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES OF SOME ANTECEDENTS AND CONSEQUENCES (J.
Macaulay & L. Berkowitz eds. 1970); B. LATANE & J. DARLEY, THE UNRESPONSIVE BY-
STANDER: WHY DOESN'T HE HELP? (1970) (both works cited in Rodgers, supra note 13, at 20
n.102). Professor Rodgers supports the general no-duty-to-rescue rule on grounds similar to
my third process constraint.
168 See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
169 See .sumra note 91 and accompanying text.
170 Landes and Posner assumed that one could compile a list of activities that are likely
to present rescue opportunities. See Landes & Posner, supra note 135, at 120.
171 For example, it is easy to see that a public beach is a place where persons will require
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Under a general duty to rescue accompanied by an objective liabil-
ity standard, abnormally timid persons would have relatively little op-
portunity to plan their activities so as to avoid the burdens of an
objective standard. 72 Their only choice would be either to take their
chances and proceed as if no duty to rescue existed or to stay home,
preferably alone-hardly a meaningful or fair choice. Of course, reli-
ance on a subjective standard would reduce the burdens on abnormally
timid persons. But even if a subjective approach would satisfy the con-
formability constraint, it would do so only by creating substantial
problems in connection with the constraints of comprehensibilty and
verifiability.
The most telling effects of recognizing a general duty to rescue
would be felt in connection with the process constraint of manageabil-
ity. In contrast to the traditional approach to negligence-based liability
in which the requirement of cause-in-fact serves, as a practical matter, to
limit the number of persons who can be joined as defendants,173 a gen-
eral duty to rescue would more frequently present situations in which an
injured plaintiff would have several persons-occasionally even a large
number-against whom to bring suit. 174 Not every instance in which
more than one person could have rescued would result in litigation in-
volving many defendants. Some plaintiffs would be unable to identify
everyone who had refused to render assistance, and others might choose
not to join all potential defendants. Although this might serve to sim-
plify some rescue cases, it would do so in ways that would give rise to
substantial unfairness objections by defendants who could legitimately
ask "why me?" Moreover, there is no guarantee that plaintiffs in these
"group failure to rescue" cases would be forced or would choose to pres-
rescue fairly frequently. However, a timid person could go to many public beaches every day
with confidence that he would not be exposed to liability because of the assured presence of
other potential , escuers, including professional lifeguards.
172 The sorts of emergencies that Weinrib envisions providing opportunities for easy res-
cue are freaks of chance that do not lend themselves .to planning ahead of time:
"[Elmergency aid does not unfairly single out one of a class of routinely advantaged persons;
the rescuer just happens to find himself for a short period in a position, which few if any
others share, to render a service. . . ... Weinrib, supra note 135, at 292.
173 It is unusual for a large number of persons to act in concert negligently so as to injure
the same plaintiff. Cases such as Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal. 2d 486, 154 P.2d 687 (1944), in
which the California court allowed the plaintiff to join a number of medical personnel be-
cause he was unable to prove which one of them injured him while he was unconscious and in
their care, are unusual.
174 The absence of a cause-in-fact requirement accompanying a general duty to rescue
leads to this multiplicty of potential defendants. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
Thus, it is physically possible for a crowd of persons to watch idly while the plaintiff suffers
harm from lack of rescue. The episode in New York City involving Kitty Genovese is a well-
known example of this phenomenon. Thirty-eight people witnessed one or more of four sepa-
rate attacks on the young woman over a half-hour period and failed to call for help. One
witness finally called the police after it was too late to save the victim's life. See generaly A.
ROSENTHAL, THiIRTY-EIGHT WTNESSES (1964).
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ent courts with bipolar tort actions. To the contrary, it could be ex-
pected that plaintiffs in a significant percentage of these cases would join
a number of defendants in order to increase their chances of recovery.
Thus, it may reasonably be assumed that judicial recognition of a gen-
eral duty to rescue frequently would present courts with cases involving
a large and relatively unmanageable number of defendants and
issues. 175
In addition, not only would the number of defendants tend to com-
plicate failure-to-rescue cases, but the interrelationships among the de-
fendants regarding the duties that they allegedly owed to the plaintiff
would present potentially high levels of polycentricity. Consider a hypo-
thetical case in which a plaintiffjoins as defendants a number of onlook-
ers for failing to come to his aid following an accident in a public place.
Each defendant would point to the presence of the other would-be res-
cuers as a relevant datum in deciding whether he should have stepped
forward. 176 Not only would each defendant present a different set of
considerations regarding relevant circumstances such as physical capac-
ity to act, timidity, and the like, but also the considerations would tend
to be mutually interdependent, causing the question "which person or
persons should have rescued?" to become highly polycentric. These
problems would be exacerbated were the plaintiff to argue that the on-
lookers should have organized a cooperative rescue effort, to which each
defendant was obligated to contribute according to his physical abilities,
psychological predispositions, and the like. 177
175 Courts have recognized these potential difficulties. See, e.g., Tarasoffv. Regents of the
Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 435 n.5, 551 P.2d 334, 343 n.5, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14, 23 n.5 (1976)
("[The absence of a general duty to rescue] owes its survival to 'the difficulties of setting any
standards of unselfish service to fellow men, and of making any workable rule to cover possi-
ble situations where fifty people might fail to rescue ... ' (Prosser, Torts (4th ed. 1971) § 56,
p. 341).")
176 If we posit the unrealistically simple situation in which five equally able-bodied and
psychologically adequate people stand and watch a child drown in six inches of pond water,
see supra note 155 and accompanying text, then the assertion of high polycentricity is inaccu-
rate because the presence of the others would not be relevant to the liability of any one of
them-they are all liable for failing to act. Yet "real life" situations would never be so simple.
Instead of floating face down in a shallow pond, the child would more likely get into difficul-
ties at a public beach unattended by a lifeguard. A number of onlookers would swear that
they believed that a lifeguard was providing help. Others would swear that they are not good
swimmers or had just eaten lunch, and assumed other, more capable, onlookers would take
action. In response to the plaintiff's argument that someone could have, at least, called for
professional assistance, all the onlookers will argue that they were "sure" that because so
many people were standing around someone had already gone for help. Given the inherent
ambiguities in such a real life situation, the tort case in which the child's family joins 50 or so
onlookers as defendants would become complicated and unmanageable.
177 Although these situations would arise infrequently, Weinrib's proposed "easy rescue"
rule, with its emphasis on low cost, would encourage plaintiffs to adopt a "group rescue"
approach because it would enable a number of onlookers to contribute modestly to effect a
rescue which in the aggregate involved a more substantial expenditure of resources. Some-
thing close to the mood of this suggestion was struck by Professor Rudolph when he addressed
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Professor Weinrib raises the question of multiple defendants only
by way of answering the earlier-described objection to his rescue rule
based on the unfairness of allowing the plaintiff to single out one or a
few from many possible defendants. His reply to the objection is inter-
esting and reflects the inadequacy of his treatment of the process impli-
cations of his proposal. He argues that the potential unfairness of
singling out one defendant could be avoided by allowing that defendant
to join others by way of seeking contribution-a solution that ignores
the negative effects ofjoinder on the manageability of such claims.178 In
support of his position he observes that multiple-tortfeasor cases arise
under traditional negligence principles, erroneously asserting that the
difficulties would be no greater in the rescue context. 179
Viewed more generally, it is a fair assessment of Weinrib's treat-
ment of rescue to conclude that he nowhere addresses the difficulties I
have herein described in connection with the manageability constraint.
The closest he comes is his recognition that the "low cost" concept will
require courts to engage in line-drawing. But the examples he uses to
show that courts can cope with what he calls "vague but manageable
concepts"-the concepts of duress and necessity from contract law-re-
veal that he is not anticipating the sorts of problems raised here.' 80
Such difficulties would not be limited to cases involving multiple
defendants. Even in cases in which recovery was sought from a single
defendant, the question of whether a general duty to rescue was
breached would present polycentric issues. In effect, the plaintiff would
be asking the court to design an alternative, more reasonable course of
the question of the difficulty of sorting out the liabilities after the fact: "We realize that in
some situations it will be difficult to know all of the persons who might have the duty [to
rescue], but in such cases the group will be large, and the hardship of contributing will be
small." Rudolph, supra note 143, at 533.
178 Weinrib, supra note 135, at 262. Although contribution may mitigate unfairness
problems, it is likely to exacerbate process problems. Conversely, holding onlookers liable on
a pro rata basis despite their culpability alleviates process problems, but causes fairness
problems to reemerge. See supra note 177.
179 Weinrib, supra note 135, at 262. Weinrib overlooks the greater likelihood of mul-
tiparty cases in the rescue context, see supra note 173 and accompanying text, as well as the
fact that the rules governing joint and several liability in traditional negligence cases render it
unnecessary to engage in the "sorting out" process described supra note 177.
180 See Weinrib, supra note 135, at 276. My process concerns extend beyond Weinrib's
concern for the judicial task of line-drawing. Weinrib's contract concepts require courts to
determine the amount of duress or necessity sufficient to obviate assent. The only real prob-
lem this question presents relates to verifiability. Duress, for example, is a comprehensible
concept. The proscription on the use of duress by contracting parties is one to which persons
are capable of conforming. Moreover, the question of "how much duress is too much?" is not
very polycentric-it calls for judgments along an essentially linear "free will/coercion" axis.
Finally, the potential verifiability problems are not as difficult in practice as they may appear
in theory; although most jurisdictions employ a subjective test, courts rely on a combination
of circumstantial evidence and presumptions to adopt a basically objective approach to the
questions of duress. See generaly Note, Economic Duress After the Demise of Free Will Theory: A
Proposed Tort Analpsi, 53 IowA L. REv. 892, 893-96 (1968).
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conduct than that undertaken by the defendant. Frequently a range of
possible responses would have been available to the defendant, each va-
rying as to probable costs and benefits. Moreover, assuming that a sub-
jective standard were employed, judges and juries would have a more
difficult task in attempting to rely on empathy. In many cases, it would
be clear enough what the defendant should have done; but in many
cases it would not, rendering difficult the task of adjudicating a "reason-
able rescue."' 81
It remains to be considered whether limiting the duty to situations
in which rescue could be effected at low cost would render these cases
manageable. Whether it would depends on the meaning given the
phrase "low cost." To impose liability whenever action could have been
taken at "relatively" low cost would not reduce the difficulties signifi-
cantly. 182 However, to impose liability only when rescue could have
been effected at practically no cost whatever to the rescuer would make
the determination easier. As the cost of rescue approaches zero, the "res-
cuer's cost" consideration moots a sufficiently large percentage of the
other considerations so as to reduce the associated polycentricity to man-
ageable levels.' 83
This conclusion does not threaten the foregoing process analysis of
the traditional no-duty-to-rescue rule. A "practically no-cost rescue"
rule still would present difficulties in connection with the other process
constraints. More important, such a rule would be of minimal social
utility. The overwhelming percentage of individuals presented with the
opportunity to effect life- or limb-saving rescue at practically no cost to
themselves will choose, almost by hypothesis, to act irrespective of any
incentives provided by tort law. 184 Exposing would-be rescuers to liabil-
181 The clear case is the "child in the pond" hypothetical. The difficult case is one in
which several alternative courses of action were available to the defendant, each with a differ-
ent set of costs and benefits. The most unmanageable cases involve situations in which several
persons were simultaneously in need of help, and in which the different forms of assistance to
each affected the costs and benefits to the others. In such circumstances the rescuer, and later
the court, would confront a highly polycentric problem of deciding on a reasonable course of
action. See supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text.
182 "Relatively" in this context connotes the cost-benefit balancing involved in tradi-
tional negligence cases and can be highly polycentric.
183 Once a court determines that there was one possible means of no-cost rescue, it is clear
that liability would result. If there were a number of no-cost means of rescue, the court's
initial determination of whether there were an, no-cost means would be simpler.
184 I believe Weinrib favors a narrow definition of "easy," and thus is advancing what
might be called an "outrageous failure to rescue" doctrine. See supra note 154. It is interesting
to observe that courts employ a somewhat analogous concept to outragous behavior to allow
recovery for the intentional infliction of mental upset. Seegeneral' RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTs § 46 (1965). But the social utility of the latter rule is significantly greater than that
of a rule imposing liability for "outrageous non-rescue." In the intentional infliction of
mental upset context, those held liable can control whom they will harm and when they will
harm them. In contrast, the defendant who commits "outrageous non-rescue" is not in con-
trol of the circumstances surrounding the opportunity to effect easy rescue. See supra note 132
CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67:901
ity for refusing to act under these unusual circumstances probably
would fail to reach the few truly sociopathic individuals who would re-
fuse to effect no-cost rescues, and might have negative effects on some of
the majority who would rescue voluntarily.185 Thus, a general duty to
rescue limited to "no cost" situations would yield little if any benefits.
Imposition of such a duty, therefore, would not justify the process
problems that it would generate.
The traditionally recognized exceptions to the no-duty-to-rescue
rule support the foregoing analysis. For example, duties to act are im-
posed on persons who have special relationships with persons requiring
rescue. 186 Such limited duties can serve as guides to primary behavior
because they tend to suggest specific courses of conduct based on the
underlying relationship. 187 Moreover, timid individuals can reduce
their exposure by avoiding the special relationships generating such du-
ties.188 At the adjudicative level, nonverifiability problems are reduced
and accompanying text. If he was in control-if he "set things up"-he falls within an excep-
tion to the no-duty rule and is liable under traditional law. Thus, even if we assume that
sociopathic individuals do exist who would stand idly by and watch other persons suffer easily
preventable injuries, in order to commit torts these sociopaths must be "lucky" enough to be
given the chance to do so. Unlike the tortfeasors who intentionally inflict mental suffering,
they cannot run next door to their neighbor's house and not rescue him.
It follows that society's need for a tort rule aimed at discouraging outrageous nonrescue
is much less compelling than is its need for a rule discouraging outrageous aggression. Society
arguably needs a rule proscribing the intentional infliction of mental suffering in order to
curb the tendencies of some persons to seek out victims upon whom to inflict emotional
trauma, and will therefore tolerate the process difficulties associated with implementing such
a rule. Because the opportunities to engage in "outrageous nonrescue" arise randomly, the
small minority of persons willing to take advantage of such opportunities receive them so
seldom that the process problems of a duty to rescue rule outweigh the minimal deterrent
value of such a rule.
185 Seegeneral'y Landes & Posner, supra note 135. Even if their conclusions are weak, they
count for something here because the benefits likely to be derived from a no-cost rescue rule
are so small.
186 See, e.g., Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 438, 551 P.2d 334,
343, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14, 23 (1976) (psychiatrist-patient); Farmer v. State ex rel. Russell, 224
Miss. 96, 105, 79 So. 2d 528, 531 (1955) (jailor-prisoner); Kambour v. Boston & Me. R.R., 77
N.H. 33, 43, 86 A. 624, 629 (1913) (common carrier-passenger). See generall' RESTATEMENT
(SEcoND) OF TORTS § 314A (1965).
187 Courts can create guidelines based on the customary patterns of behavior asociated
with each relationship. For example, in Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d
425, 551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976), the court imposed a duty on a psychiatrist either
to warn the intended victim of his potentially violent patient or to have the patient confined.
Such a duty is not imposed unless the psychiatrist knows or objectively should know of the
danger his patient presents. Once the danger is known, warning or confinement are courses of
action suggested by the psychiatrist's professional relationship with his patient. Often the
duty based on a special relationship is less demanding. Common carriers orjailors, who have
people under their control for periods of time, have a duty to see that passengers and prison-
ers receive adequate medical attention. See, e.g., Conolly v. Crescent City R.R., 41 La. Ann.
57, 61, 5 So. 259, 260 (1888).
188 Most of the activities charged with special duties are those entered into voluntarily
(e.g., doctor, jailor, common carrier). See supra note 186. The most troublesome relationships
from this perspective are familial relationships that are not voluntary-for example, the rela-
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by the application of an objective standard that is easier to defend on
fairness grounds if the basis for the duty is a special relationship volunta-
rily entered into. 8 9 The difficulties associated with "what would have
happened if. . . ?" inquiries are mitigated by the understandable will-
ingness of courts to rely on the types of tacit assumptions that render
manageable the issue of proximate causation under traditional negli-
gence principles. 90
The most dramatic effects of the special-relationship exception are
the ways in which it helps to render rescue cases judicially manageable.
By hypothesis, the special-relationship requirement limits the number of
potential tortfeasors and returns the relevant litigation closer to the bi-
polar mode. This reduces polycentricity to the extent that the tribunal
is called upon to determine the reasonableness of the failure of an indi-
vidual defendant or a small group of defendants to undertake a specific
course of rescue derived from the nature of the underlying relationship.
This analysis applies to the other exceptions, including those based
on the defendant's abandoning a rescue attempt' 91 and the defendant's
knowingly having caused the plaintiff's predicament. 9 2 In each in-
stance, the special features upon which the exception is based provide a
sufficiently narrowed focus for the duty-to-rescue rule to serve as a guide
to both primary and adjudicative behavior. 193
tionship between brothers. Consistent with this analysis, it is not clear whether duties to
rescue are actually recognized in such cases. See general4
, 
W. PROSSER, supra note 16, at 342.
189 The courts apply an objective standard. See, e.g., Anderson v. Atchison, Topeka &
Santa Fe Ry., 333 U.S. 821, 823 (1948) ("what 'a reasonable and prudent man would ordina-
rily have done under the circumstances of the situation.' "); Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ.
of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 439, 551 P.2d 334, 345, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14, 25 (1976) ("applicable
professional standards").
190 Prosser describes the tendency toward leniency in this way: "When a child is
drowned in a swimming pool, no one can say with certainty that a lifeguard would have
saved him; but the experience of the community permits the conclusion that the absence of
the guard played a significant part in the drowning." W. PROSSER, supra note 16, at 242
(footnote omitted). It is probably fair to characterize the judicial attitude in these cases as
one of relative, not complete, leniency. Thus, the surrounding circumstances established by
the plaintiff must support, if not require, the conclusion that rescue would have helped. If it
is clear that rescue was impossible, courts will direct verdicts for defendants. See, e.g., Ford v.
Trident Fisheries Co., 232 Mass. 400, 122 N.E. 389 (1919).
191 See, e.g., Farwell v. Keaton, 396 Mich. 281,287, 240 N.W.2d 217, 220 (1976); Zelenko
v. Gimbel Bros., 158 Misc. 904, 904, 287 N.Y.S. 134, 135 (Sup. Ct. 1935), aJ'd, 247 A.D. 867,
287 N.Y.S. 136 (1936) (per curiam). See general/y RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 323
(1965); W. PROSSER, supra note 16, at 343-48.
192 See, e.g., Tubbs v. Argus, 140 Ind. App. 695, 699, 225 N.E.2d 841, 843 (1967). Ames
was the first to distinguish between one who refused to aid another and one who refused
another aid when he had caused, although innocently, the other's peril. See Ames, supra note
135, at 111-12.
193 As explained earlier, the special-relationship exception suggests fairly specific courses
of action. See supra note 186 and accompanying text. The exception that is based on the
arbitrary abandonment of a rescue attempt also suggests this. The defendant owes a duty to
carry through with the specific course of action he begins to undertake. Moreover, the de-
fendant, by volunteering, has demonstrated that the rescue required of him by law is one that
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In seeking to explain in process terms the rules governing liability
for failure to rescue, I am not suggesting that substantive reasons have
played no role in explication. I strongly urge, however, that to attempt
to explain these rescue rules solely in terms of the substantive objectives
of tort law can lead to questionable conclusions. An example of this is
Professor Epstein's treatment of tort rules relating to rescue. His basic
thesis is that the underlying justification for allowing A to recover in tort
from B is that B caused harm to A. 194 1 interpret him to be relying on
the general no-duty-to-rescue rule, together with its various exceptions,
to support his position that in the absence of a cause-in-fact connection
between B's conduct and A's harm, A has no moral claim against B for
compensation. 195
I submit that the foregoing process explanation of the no-duty-to-
rescue rule is more helpful than Professor Epstein's explanation based on
the absence of cause-in-fact. Confronting a no-duty-to-rescue rule that
appears to contradict traditional principles of social morality, Professor
Epstein has reasoned backwards to a substantive position that appears
intuitively questionable. But whether or not his reasons are persuasive,
Epstein at least has reached the right conclusion-that a general duty to
rescue, even if limited in the ways suggested by Weinrib's analysis,
should not be recognized. Viewed substantively, Professor Weinrib cor-
rectly discerns that an actor is morally obligated to intervene in an
he is very likely to be capable of performing. Interestingly, the exception based on cause-in-
fact does not seem to fit this pattern. The coincidence that the defendant's innocent conduct
caused the plaintiffs predicament does not suggest a specific course of action, nor does it
make the defendant a volunteer. Furthermore, it does not guarantee in any way that the
defendant is capable of undertaking the rescue. Thus, the willingness of courts to impose a
duty to rescue based merely on cause-in-fact appears, at least at first glance, to be inconsistent
with my analysis.
But the cases frequently cited to support the cause-in-fact exception involve elements in
addition to cause-in-fact that reduce the process difficulties just described. Montgomery v.
National Convoy & Trucking Co., 186 S.C. 167, 195 S.E. 247 (1938), and Rains v. Heldenfels
Bros., 443 S.W.2d 280 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969) both involved duties to aid others injured while
driving on the highway. The Montgomery Court speaks in terms of a special relationship
among all highway travelers, rather than in terms of cause-in-fact. 186 S.C. at 176, 195 S.E.
at 251. Indeed, specific duties based on such a special relationship are imposed by statute in a
number of states. See generally Annot., 80 A.L.R.2d 299 (1961). Another case often cited in
support of the cause-in-fact exception is L.S. Ayres & Co. v. Hicks, 220 Ind. 86, 50 N.E.2d 334
(1942). There, a child's fingers were caught in an escalator and injured before department
store personnel could shut the escalator off. The court found the store negligent for failing to
act quickly enough and raised the possibility that the duty to rescue the child might arise
because the defendant's instrument harmed the plaintiff. Id at 94-95, 40 N.E.2d at 337.
However, the decision could just as easily be read to rest on the duty owed by a landowner to
his invitees. Id; see also Connelly v. Kaufmann & Baer Co., 349 Pa. 261, 37 A.2d 125 (1944)
(court found defendant liable for escalator injury because of special relationship of common
carrier to passenger).
194 See Epstein, sufra note 2, 3 L. LEGAL STUD. 151.
195 Professor Weinrib suggests one interpretation of Epstein's analysis--"that rescue is a
moral requirement but ... that it should [not] be a legal one." Weinrib, supira note 135, at
261. This view of Epstein's thesis is compatible with my process analysis.
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emergency situation to save a stranger, at least when he can do so at
relatively small cost. 196 But Weinrib overstates the moral basis for a
general duty to rescue by ignoring the relevance of the comprehensibil-
ity, verifiability, and conformability constraints on primary behavior.
Moreover, by focusing on the moral side of the question, he ignores the
difficulties in judicially administering a rescue rule. When the adminis-
trative difficulties of applying such a rule in court are adequately con-
sidered, the traditional no-general-duty-to-rescue rule seems the fairest
and most efficient course.' 9 7
CONCLUSION
The thesis of this article is that process constraints have played an
important role in shaping the content of common law rules governing
tort liability. The absence at common law of a general duty to rescue is
perhaps the best example of a rule that cannot be understood ade-
quately without reference to the process perspective. Efficiency theorists
have stretched their rationales to try to accommodate this no-duty
rule, 98 and at least one fairness theorist has used the rule as part of the
basis for a decidedly nontraditional substantive overview of tort law.199
Notwithstanding these attempts to reconcile the no-duty-to-rescue rule
with substantive tort objectives, this article has shown that the rule can
be understood best from a process perspective. Courts have refused to
impose a general duty to rescue largely because it would be unmanage-
able as a guide to either primary or adjudicative behavior. Because it
fails adequately to take into account the relevant process implications,
Professor Weinrib's recently-proposed "easy-rescue" rule must be re-
jected as unworkable.
It may serve to strengthen the conclusions reached in this article to
observe that the process perspective developed herein has a broader
range of applications than merely to tort law.20 0 Although these appli-
196 Commentators have criticized the no-duty-to-rescue rule for its moral shortcoming.
See, e.g., Ames, supra note 135, at 112. Professor Weinrib makes this observation: "Criticism
of the common-law position on rescue, after all, rests on the perception that, as a matter of
inarticulate common sense, it is wrong for one person to stand by as another suffers an injury
that could easily be prevented." Weinrib, supra note 135, at 260. For a more formal analysis
of the moral underpinnings of a duty to rescue, see id at 279-92.
197 That one state-Vermont-has enacted duty-to-rescue legislation imposing criminal
penalties does not detract from this analysis; the exercise of prosecutorial discretion has as-
sured that process problems do not arise. See a/so VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 519 (1973). See
generally Franklin, supra note 135, at 60.
198 See, e.g., Landes & Posner, supra note 135; see also supra notes 141-42 and accompany-
ing text.
199 See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 2, 3 L. Legal Stud. 151; see also supra notes 194-97 and
accompanying text.
200 The law of contracts reflects the norms, perhaps even more so than in the law of torts.
For an interesting treatment of the process implications of the legal requirement of considera-
tion, see Fuller, Consideration and Fonn, 41 COLUM. L. REv. 799 (1941). Professor Fuller distin-
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cations are beyond the scope of the present analysis, one area-substan-
tive criminal law-is sufficiently analogous to tort law to merit brief
comment. Certainly no other area of law reflects a clearer recognition of
the comprehensibility constraint. Courts and commentators both have
recognized that criminal law rules must be understandable if they are to
serve as guides to primary behavior. 20' Indeed, vagueness is an in-
dependent ground for invalidation of criminal rules.20 2
Some of the most interesting features of substantive criminal law
are the techniques relied upon to accommodate the verifiability con-
straint. Criminal law invites process problems with its rhetorical com-
mitment to the inherently nonverifiable culpability of the individual.20 3
As might be expected from the foregoing analysis of tort law, upon
closer examination the rules of decision are more objective than the cul-
pability rhetoric would lead one to believe.204 Substantive criminal law
nevertheless retains sufficient subjectivity in connection with issues such
as intent and competency to generate significant problems of ver-
ifiability.20 5 The most important technique with which the system has
tried to cope with these problems is the requirement that the state prove
guishes between the "formal" and "substantive" aspects of consideration, and resolves to
disentangle them. Id at 799-800. He describes three functions generally performed by legal
formalities: (1) the evidentiary function, which he thinks of as primarily being useful to the
parties; (2) the cautionary function, which aids the contracting parties by impressing upon
them that they are legally bound; and (3) the channeling function, which assists courts in
trying to determine the enforceablity of promises. Id at 800-03. All three of Fuller's "func-
tions of formality" relate to my verifiability constraint. His first function relates to the need
for one party to be able to prove to the other the existence of a contract. His second function
relates to the desirability of allowing each party to verify for himself that he is entering an
enforceable contract. His third function relates to the need for courts to be able to verify the
existence of the contract after the fact.
201 "Laws which create crime ought to be so explicit that all men subject to their penal-
ties may know what acts it is their duty to avoid." United States v. Brewer, 139 U.S. 278, 288
(1891).
202 See id Seegeneral'y W. LAFAvE & A. ScoTT, CRIMINAL LAW § 11 (1972); Aigler, Lgis-
lation in Vague or General Tem, 21 MICH. L. REv. 831 (1923).
203 See generally W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, supra note 202, at § 27.
204 "Despite its subjective-sounding rhetoric, the criminal law is generally unwilling to
vary legal norms in order to accommodate a particular individual's capacity to meet the
standards they prescribe." Arenella, Book Review, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 420, 427 (1980); see
also Dix, Psychological Abnormality As a Factor in Grading Criminal Liability: Diminished Capacit,
Diminished Responsibility, and the Like, 62 J. GRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 313, 316-
17 (1971).
205 The process problems associated with what one author has described as "the criminal
law's attempt to draw a sharp line between the 'mad' actor who is not criminally responsible
for his behavior and the 'bad' actor who is accountable" have received a great deal of atten-
tion. See Arenella, The Diminished Capacity and Diminished Responsibility Defenses: Two Children of
a Doomed Marage, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 827, 828 (1977). The source of the difficulty lies in the
practical impossibility in many instances of distinguishing between illness and evil. For a
recent and extensive bibliography of writings on the subject, see H. FINGARETrE & A. HAssE,
MENTAL DISABILITIES AND CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILIT 299-310 (1979).
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the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.20 6 This requirement
reflects a recognition that verification errors will occur frequently, and
tries to ensure that most of the errors are of the "guilty actor goes free"
variety.20 7
Even if the elements of subjectivity associated with standards of
criminal culpability present problems of verifiability, they help to solve
some of the potential problems of conformability. Except for small
pockets of strict liability that have been criticized by commentators,20 8
substantive criminal law avoids setting standards of conduct to which
individuals are unable to conform. Regarding the constraint of man-
ageability, substantive criminal law avoids presenting courts with highly
complex, polycentric problems. Criminal cases are typically bipolar dis-
putes in which the major issues requiring resolution are of the "what
happened?" variety. This is especially significant given the system's
heavy reliance on traditional forms of adjudication.20 9
In advancing the process perspective outlined in this article, I have
been careful not to insist that process constraints present mandates in
anything approaching absolute terms. What is required is an accommo-
dation of substantive objectives and process constraints. The most sig-
nificant example of such an accommodation in traditional tort doctrine
is the development of the rules governing liability for harm caused by
negligent conduct. Although the underlying negligence principle of
"reasonableness under the circumstances" threatens to ask more of the
courts than they can deliver, adjustments in doctrines and processes
have succeeded by and large in keeping traditional negligence law on
the right track. Indeed, a number of these doctrinal adjustments can be
understood adequately only from a perspective that includes process as
well as substantive considerations.
Accepting for argument's sake that the traditional tort system has
managed to accommodate substantive objectives within the relevant
process constraints, one may wonder if reasons exist for believing that
we may be in a period of transition toward some new regime in which
process considerations are given less weight or perhaps ignored alto-
gether. I would be the first to concede that if our traditional tort system
were someday entirely replaced by a bureaucratically administered sys-
tem of social insurance, 210 the process constraints would matter less or at
206 See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361 (1970). See general MCCORMICK'S HAND-
BOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 798-99 (2d ed. 1972).
207 See MCCORMICK'S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE, supra note 206; Ball, The
Moment of Tnjtk- Probabili Theory and Standards of Proof 14 VAND. L. REV. 806, 816 (1961).
208 See generally W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, supra note 202, § 31; Hart, The Aims of the Crimi-
nal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 401, 422-25 (1958).
209 The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution creates a right to jury trial in
criminal cases. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
210 For a description and analysis of the New Zealand Compensation System, which all
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least would have very different applications.2 1' But what if the tort sys-
tem survives more or less intact, purporting to rely on both prospective,
self-applying rules of conduct and traditional forms of adjudication-
will it continue to accommodate substantive objectives within process
constraints?
I can discern two factors that will test the continuing vitality of the
process constraints in the coming years. The first of the factors is a
growing impatience of courts and commentators with trying to accom-
modate substantive objectives within the constraints of process. Tradi-
tionally, the primary objective of tort law has been the resolution of
private disputes between individuals. 2 12 Larger issues concerning public
welfare have always been reflected in tort decisions, but the major focus
has been on defining the rights and duties between individual litigants.
Given this traditional focus, it is easy to understand how the tort system
has accommodated the constraints of process. In recent years, however,
the focus in tort cases has shifted towards courts' addressing the larger
social issues more directly; judges are increasingly being asked to define
their roles more as vindicators of public interests than as resolvers of
private disputes.2 13 The "ends justify the means" flavor of recent trends
in public law litigation appears to be spilling over into areas tradition-
ally thought to be part of the private law of torts. 2 14 To some extent, of
course, this last observation begs the question of whether tort law is, or
has become, public law.2 15 But unlike these emerging areas of public
law, the tort system continues to rely on both self-applying rules of con-
duct and traditional forms of adjudication. Moreover, the social imper-
atives that arguably justify the abandonment of traditional process
constraints in areas such as public school desegregation and voting
rights are not so strong in areas such as products liability and environ-
mental torts. 2 16 It follows that the growing impatience with traditional
but abolishes tort liability in that country, see G. PALMER, COMPENSATION FOR INCAPACITY
(1979).
211 The first three constraints would be relevant to the behavior of the bureaucrats ad-
ministering the system. Depending upon the nature of the compensation system, the con-
straints might apply to primary behavior as well.
212 See generally Englard, supra note 86, at 27-28.
213 Id at 28-30; see also Henderson, supra note 5, at 523.
214 With respect to parallel trends in tort law, the Supreme Court of California has be-
come something of a role model.
215 Some commentators argue that tort law should become public law:
The conclusion is that the New Torts must be made to deal more explicitly
with the question of what large enterprises and other clusters of power owe to
the individual caught in their toils. . . . The New Torts then will emphasize
more sharply the question ofwhat defendants representing significant clusters
of different kinds of power owe to our civilization in the way of behaving in a
civilized manner.
Shapo, Changing Frontiers in Torts: Vistas for the 70's, 22 STAN. L. REv. 330, 334-35 (1970).
216 These areas of tort law involve disputes that affect persons other than the immediate
parties. For example, when an injured consumer sues a manufacturer, claiming that the de-
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process constraints is less legitimate in the latter areas than in the for-
mer. Simply stated, the process constraints should count for more in
products liability actions than in school desegregation cases. 21 7
The second factor that can be expected to present process difficul-
ties in coming years is the effect of complex technology on the tort sys-
tem.218 Most of the difficulties are likely to arise in the context of
applying negligence principles in reviewing highly technological behav-
ior. Not only do cases involving complex technology tend to involve
polycentric issues for decision, 219 but also the presence of technological
issues interferes with the opportunity for judges and juries to rely on
empathy. Confronted with exceedingly difficult issues in such cases, and
unable to rely on a combination of empathy and intuition, deci-
sionmakers are left with a limited number of alternatives. They may
assume the posture of a manager and decide the case based on a mixture
of discretion and intuition;220 they may attempt to quantify the relevant
variables to the point that the "correct" decision can be reached
mechanically; 22' they may limit their involvement in the decision pro-
sign of the manufacturer's product is unreasonably dangerous, the case has implications be-
yond the plaintiffs right to recover damages. Design alterations to avoid future lawsuits may
increase the price of the product, a consequence that affects a large number of persons. The
broader implications of dangerous product designs can be, and in fact have been, addressed
by other means of governmental control. No political impasse need be overcome to hold the
manufacturer liable to pay damages. Consumers in this country will not be abandoned to
their fates at the hands of manufacturers if courts focus on the private remedy aspects of
design cases and zontinue to give considerable weight to the process constraints.
217 Perhaps the most difficult tort actions to contain within traditional boundaries are
those involving toxic substances such as DES and Agent Orange. In recent years, thousands
of plaintiffs have joined in class actions to recover for harms allegedly caused by widely dis-
tributed drugs and chemicals. See, e.g., Sindell v. Abbott Labs, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924,
163 Cal. Rptr. 132, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980); In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig.,
635 F.2d 987 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 992 (1981). Cases of this sort require new
approaches to procedures and remedies. To the extent that these cases exceed the abilities of
the courts to manage them, they will almost certainly be addressed legislatively, very proba-
bly by the Congress. The availability of such alternative approaches underscores a basic
difference between tort law and the public law controversies discussed earlier. Courts should
feel less pressured to abandon the traditional process constraints in these tort cases because
there are other ways of dealing with the broader issues of social policy. See generally Yellin,
High Technolog, and the Courts: Nuclear Power and the Needfor Institutional Reform, 94 HARv. L.
REV. 489 (1981); Note, Allocating the Costs of Hazardos Waste Disposal, 94 HARV. L. REV. 584
(1981); supra note 41.
218 For an early article exploring some of the problems likely to be encountered, see Katz,
The Function of Tort Liability in Technology Assessment, 38 U. CIN. L. REv. 587 (1969). See gener-
al5 Henderson, supra note 5, at 484-501; Yellin, supra note 217.
219 Just as a court would confront high levels ofpolycentricity in determining the reason-
ableness of a city manager's budget decisions, see supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text, a
court would confront polycentricity in determining the reasonableness of an engineer's deci-
sions concerning the application of advanced technology. Se general Henderson, supra note
5, at 484-501.
220 See sura text accompanying note 41.
221 Such an approach creates, at best, a misleading illusion of precision and certainty. See
generally Tribe, supra note 56.
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cess to merely deciding, on the basis of credentials and general de-
meanor, which expert's opinion to adopt as their own;2 22 or they may
simply (and secretly) flip a coin.223
Consistent with this analysis, the areas of tort law in which the pro-
cess constraints are most likely to be ignored in coming years are those
involving judicial determinations of the reasonableness of high-technol-
ogy decisions affecting large numbers of persons-areas such as products
liability, environmental torts, and actions based on the disposal of haz-
ardous wastes. Not surprisingly, process difficulties are already being
encountered in these areas.224 Assuming that these developments in tort
law reflect legitimate substantive concerns, the desirable objective
should not be to eliminate entirely the process difficulties. Again, what
we should strive to achieve are reasonable accommodations of substan-
tive objectives within process constraints. What can be done to main-
tain and in some instances to restore such accommodations? First,
courts and commentators working with what I have called "private tort
law" could become more sensitive to the inherent limitations of process
while pursuing legitimate substantive goals. Second, in those areas in
which the substantive pressures appear too great to resist, serious atten-
tion should be given to replacing traditional approaches with new ones
that do not rely so heavily on prospective, self-applying rules of conduct
or on traditional forms of adjudication. 225 Until such reforms occur, it
will be necessary to formulate liability rules that, while reflecting the
relevant substantive objectives, serve effectively as guides to primary
and adjudicative behavior. This is not an easy task, but it must be ac-
complished if we are to have an effective tort system.
222 For an enlightening treatment of the use and abuse of expert testimony in product
design litigation see Donaher, Piehler, Twerski & Weinstein, The Technological Expert in Products
Liability Litigation, 52 TEXAs L. REiv. 1303 (1974).
223 See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
224 See generaly Henderson, supra note 5, at 484-501; Note, supra note 217.
225 The thrust of this analysis is not that our tort system must continue to rely on these
traditional elements, but rather that as long as it does continue to rely on them, conformity to
the process constraints described herein is necessary if the system is to achieve its objectives. If
the system purports to rely on self-applying rules and the traditional processes of adjudication
while ignoring the relevant process constraints, it will be guilty of hypocritical lawlessness.
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